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The main purpose of this study is to investigate the optimal strategy and the 
welfare effects of technology improvements in the open economy.  The first 
essay, “Hicks Theorem: Effects of Technological Improvement in the 
Ricardian Model” studies these questions with the Ricardian model. The essay 
formally proves Hicks’ (1953) insight into the effects of technological 
improvement: uniform technological improvement at home benefits all 
countries (or at least does not hurt); export-biased technological improvement 
at home benefits the foreign country (or at least does not hurt), but import-
biased technological improvement at home can hurt the foreign country if the 
comparative advantage is not reversed.  
The paper then studies optimal strategies of technological improvement 
and shows that for a small country it is optimal to choose export-biased 
technological improvement. For a large country, it is optimal to improve 
technology in both sectors at a rate proportional to the consumers’ expenditure 
share.  
The second essay, “A Two-Sector Eaton and Kortum Model: 
Technological Changes and International Trade” studies the effects of 
technological changes with a two-sector Eaton and Kortum model. This paper 
distinguishes two types of technology changes: changes in the technology 
levels (technology improvements) and changes in the dispersion of 
productivity of firms. The paper shows that technology improvements always 
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increase the total trade. Technology improvements increase inter-industry trade 
if they originate in the comparative advantage sector, otherwise they decreas  
inter-industry trade. Increases in the degree of heterogeneity always increase 
the total trade and inter-industry trade. 
The essay also analyzes the welfare effects of technology improvements 
and yields some new results. It shows that with the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function technology improvements are always beneficial to the innovator. In 
agreement with the literature, export-biased improvements benefit the foreign 
country.  In a departure from the literature, however, the paper shows that 
import-biased improvements could benefit the foreign country. The essay also 
shows that when the final goods are complements, immiserizing growth may 
occur. 
The theoretical model of the paper shows that the net exports of the 
comparative advantage sector are positive while those of the other sector are 
negative. This offers us a testable hypothesis about the Ricardian trade model. 
Using the OECD STAN databases, the paper conducts some simple tests 
concerning the prediction and finds strong support for it. The Ricardian model 
is one of the pillars of the international trade theory, but there have been few 
empirical tests of it. The results of this work will enrich the literature in this 
field. 
The third essay, “Hicks Path: The Optimal Strategy of Technological 
Improvement in the open economy” extends the Eaton and Kortum framework 
into a multi-sector model to analyze the innovation pattern of countries.  The 
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model shows that the R&D activities are determined by sectoral expenditure 
and research efficiency. The model also shows that the laissez faire R&D input 
level is less than the socially optimal R&D input level in autarky when there 
are two sectors. In the open economy the R&D input in an industry depends on 
the country’s advantage in the industry.  
 Using the OECD STAN database, the empirical analysis finds some 
support for Hicks’ path, a technology improvement strategy for countries 
advanced by Hicks, but it also indicates that the R&D pattern in the real world 




Chapter 1 :  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Background 
Technological change has always been an important issue in economi s. In 
the fields of economic growth and economic development, researchers have 
studied how countries improve their technologies and how technical progress 
affects the economy. Extensive as it is, the literature in these fi lds did not do 
justice to international trade. In the real world, though, international trade 
becomes increasingly important. The export’s share in GDP is as high as 
129.8% for Singapore and 109.7% for Hong Kong (IMF, 1998), and the 
growth rate of exports has been around 20% for the last ten years in China, 
who ranked third in merchandise trade in 2005 (WTO, 2007).  
These facts attract economists’ attention and they begin to use the trade 
framework to analyze the issues concerning technological progress. The 
theoretical work on these issues can be divided into two categories according 
to the trade theories they use. The first stream is based on theRicardian model 
and the second stream is based on the Eaton Kortum framework. There is also 
a great deal of empirical work on the effects and the strategy of technological 
progress based on various trade models.    
1.1.1. Theoretical Study Based on the Ricardian Model 
Theoretical works on technical progress based on the Ricardian model date 
back to Ricardo himself. However, most papers in this stream of research have 
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appeared in recent decades. Hicks (1958) analyzed how technology 
improvements in one country affect its trade partners’ welfare and payment 
balance.  Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) prove that a uniform 
technology improvement in the foreign country will improve the home 
country’s welfare in a continuum-good Ricardian model. Choi and Yu (1987) 
study the welfare effect of Hicks-neutral technical progress under variable 
returns to scale. They find that for a small country, technology improvement 
benefits itself under certain circumstances, and the technology improvement 
may hurt other countries. They also study how technology improvements affect 
a country’s terms of trade. Markusen and Svensson (1985) study how Hicks-
neutral technological differences between two similar countries affect th m. 
Krugman (1986) uses a model of “technology gaps” to explain how the 
technology evolution pattern determines the economy pattern. Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) study how learning-by-doing, R&D and diffusion determine 
the technology progress. They also summarize the welfare effects of technical 
progress, which seems to bring closure to this issue.  However, several years 
later, the issue regains its popularity when people are arguing about the impact 
of globalization. Samuelson (2004) calls our attention to the fact that 
developing countries could improve their technologies to the detriment of 




1.1.2. Theoretical Study Based on the Heterogeneous Firms Framework 
The second stream of theoretical research is based on the heterogeneous 
firms framework. As important as it is, “the problem with the (Ricardian 
model) as a vehicle for discussing technical change is that too many things can 
happen (Krugman, 1986).” The switches in trade regimes make the analysis 
quite complicated. Moreover, the Ricardian model makes some strong 
assumptions, such as perfect competition and homogeneous firms. These 
assumptions have not been a problem because traditionally trade theory has 
been aimed at understanding aggregate evidence on topics such as the factor 
content of trade and industry specialization. These flaws encourage economists 
to develop new models to study technological progress in the trade framework. 
On the other hand, economists begin to emphasize the effects of trade on micro 
issues such as plant sizes and worker productivity. To this end, the trade theory 
should take into consideration the differences among individual producers 
within an industry. The new trade theory, which is based on the heterogeneous-
firms framework, incorporates these elements and has become a popular model 
for studying technical change.  
The Melitz’ (2003) model and the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model are two 
important frameworks that model the heterogeneity of firms in international 
trade. The Melitz model allows for imperfect competition and infinite goods 
varieties. It is often used to analyze intra-industry reallocatin. The Eaton-
Kortum model assumes perfect competition and a fixed continuum of goods. 
The core assumption of the Eaton-Kortum model is that the productivity of a 
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firm in a country is a random draw from a Fréchet distribution, whose 
parameters represent the country’s technology level. The model assume  that 
the final goods are produced with intermediate goods, which is in turn 
produced with intermediate goods and labor. The framework also allows for 
multiple countries and geographical barriers. Overall, the setup is more 
realistic than the Ricardian model.  
1.1.3. Empirical Study  
Besides the above two streams of theoretical study, there has been rich 
literature on the empirical study of the welfare effects and the optimal strategy 
of technology improvements. Eaton and Kortum’s(1999) paper is most 
relevant to this project. It measures the effects of research on the state of 
technology of foreign countries. In their model, new ideas diffuse across 
countries and all countries grow at the same steady-state rate. Res arch effort 
is determined by the gains from the world market. They find that research 
performed in foreign countries is about two-thirds as potent as domestic 
research. Eaton et al. (1998) study what determines the research efforts of 
European countries. They find that the size of the domestic markets is more 
important than the research efficiency. Bernstein and Mohnen (1998) 
investigate the bilateral link between the U.S. and Japanese economies in terms 
of how R&D capital formation in one country affects the production structu e, 
physical and R&D capital accumulation, and productivity growth in the other 
country. Clerides et al. (1998) study how exports affect a country’s technology 
level. Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco shows that the positive 
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association between exporting and efficiency can be explained by the self-
selection of the more efficient firms into the export market.  
1.1.4. Related Literature 
  Besides the above three streams of research, there are many related papers 
that help us understand the welfare effects and the optimal strategy of 
technology improvements.  The first group of papers is on the evolution of 
technology. Kortum (1997) develops a search-theoretic model of technological 
change. Researchers randomly draw new ideas from a distribution. If the new 
idea surpasses the state-of-the-art technology, it becomes the new t chnology 
frontier. Technology improvements become increasingly difficult as the 
technological frontier advances. This accounts for the fact that patents grew 
steadily as the research effort rose sharply in the past century. Kortum shows 
that if researchers sample from Pareto distributions, the distribution of the 
productivity of individual firms converge to Fréchet distributions in law. The 
Fréchet distribution has some nice mathematical properties. It can also be 
converted into an exponential distribution à la Avarez and Lucas (2007). 
Eaton, Gutierrez, and Kortum (1998), Eaton and Kortum (2001a) provide 
further analysis of research indicators across countries and over time. 
The second group of related papers studies the welfare effects of patent 
protection. Deardoff (1992) shows that while the welfare of the innovator 
increases that of other countries decreases as the protection strengthens. 
Helpman (1993) studies how the protection of intellectual property rights 
affects the welfare of each country. He decomposes the effects into four items: 
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(1) Terms of trade, (2) Production composition, (3) Available products, and (4) 
Inter-temporal allocation of consumption. He claims that when the imitat on 
rate is low, tighter protection will hurt both parties.  Grossman and Lai (2002) 
study how governments protect intellectual property. They consider two 
countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation, and in 
their absolute and comparative advantage in manufacturing. The strength of 
IPR protection is correlated with the duration of a country's patents. They
study why patents are longer in the North. They also show us an efficient 
global regime of patent protection. The issue has been revisited recntly by 
Gancia (2003) as well as by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005). 
1.2. Objectives of the Study  
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the optimal strategy and the 
welfare effects of technology improvements in the open economy. The project 
is divided into three papers. The first paper endogenizes technology progress in 
the Ricardian model and investigates its welfare effects. The second paper 
analyzes the effects of technology changes in a trade framework that 
incorporates the heterogeneity of firms. The third essay looks at the the optimal 
strategy of technology improvement.  
1.3. Motivation for the Study 
Each of these papers addresses some interesting questions and fills i  some 
gaps in the literature. As for the first paper, many economists (e.g., Hicks, 
Grossman and Helpman) have mentioned the welfare effects of technology 
improvements in the Ricardian model. However, most of them focus on one or 
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two trade regimes and ignore the switches in trade patterns. For such a 
benchmark model, I believe, it is worth the effort to consider all the
possibilities and to give a complete analysis of the welfare eff cts of 
technology improvements. As for the optimal strategy of technology 
development, there is no literature that endogenizes technology progress in the 
Ricardian model. Moreover, most of the literature assumes technology 
progress to be uniform. In the Ricardian, we can model biased technology 
improvement and it gives us several new results. 
The second paper addresses some questions that are of interest to many 
economists. Recently, economists have been concerned with the assumption of 
homogeneous firms in trade theories. They point out that this assumption is 
inconsistent with economic facts (e.g., Melitz, 2002; Bernard et al., 2003). On 
the other hand, papers based on the assumption of heterogeneous firms show 
us some new mechanisms through which trade affect countries (e.g., M litz, 
2002; Demidova, 2005). However, some results of this stream of research are 
contradictory with those of the Ricardian model.  
The third paper studies the pattern of R&D of countries. Hicks (1953) 
argued that “the first stage in a process of development is very likely to be 
export-biased,” and then “… the process passes into its second stage … that 
are import-biased.”  Thus when his analysis “is put into an historical dress, it 
suggests as a normal sequence the succession of an export-biased by an 
import-biased phase” (Hicks, 1953), a pattern that I refer to as the Hicks path 
hereafter. Interesting as it is, neither Hicks himself nor other economists have 
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conducted formal empirical tests on the Hicks path. To fill this gap, the third 
essay provides a theoretical foundation for Hicks path in this paper and study if 
it exists in the data. 
1.4. Results of the Study 
The first essay, “Hicks Theorem: Effects of Technological Improvement in 
the Ricardian Model” studies these questions with the Ricardian model. The 
paper formally proves Hicks’ (1953) insight into the effects of technological 
improvement: uniform technological improvement at home benefits all 
countries (or at least does not hurt); export-biased technological improvement 
at home benefits the foreign country (or at least does not hurt), but import-
biased technological improvement at home can hurt the foreign country as long 
as the comparative advantage is not reversed.  
The paper then studies optimal strategies of technological improvement 
and shows that for a small country it is optimal to choose export-biased 
technological improvement. For a large country, it is optimal to improve 
technology in both sectors at a rate proportional to the consumers’ expenditure 
share.  
The second essay, “A Two-Sector Eaton and Kortum Model: 
Technological Changes and International Trade” studies the effects of 
technological changes with a two-sector Eaton and Kortum model. This paper 
distinguishes two types of technology changes: changes in the technology 
levels (technology improvements) and changes in the dispersion of 
productivity of firms. The paper shows that technology improvements always 
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increase the total trade. They increase inter-industry trade if they originate in 
the comparative advantage sector, otherwise they decreases inter-industry 
trade. Increases in the degree of heterogeneity always increase the total trade 
and inter-industry trade. 
The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of technology improvements 
and yields some new results. It shows that with the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function technology improvements are always beneficial to the innovator. In 
agreement to the literature, export-biased improvements benefit the foreign 
country.  In a departure from the literature, however, the paper shows that 
import-biased improvements could benefit the foreign country. The paper also 
shows that when the final goods are complements, immiserizing growth may 
occur. 
The theoretical model of the paper shows that the net exports of the 
comparative advantage sector are positive while those of the other sector are 
negative. This offers us a testable hypothesis about the Ricardian trade model. 
Using the OECD STAN databases, the paper conducts some simple tests 
concerning the prediction and finds strong support for it. The Ricardian model 
is one of the pillars of the international trade theory, but there have been few 
empirical tests of it. The results of this work will serve to enrich the literature 
in this field. 
The third essay, “Hicks Path: The Optimal Strategy of Technological 
Improvement in the open economy” extends the Eaton and Kortum framework 
into a multi-sector model to analyze the innovation pattern of countries.  The 
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model shows that the R&D activities are determined by the sectoral 
expenditure and the research efficiency. The model also shows that the laissez 
faire R&D input level is less than the socially optimal level in autarky when 
there are two sectors. In the open economy the R&D input in an industry 
depends on the country’s advantage in the industry.  
 Using the OECD STAN database, the empirical analysis finds some 
support for Hicks’ path but it also indicates that the R&D pattern in the real 
world might be richer than what Hicks predicted. Within each industry, for the 
majority of countries (whose technology frontier ranks in the top 70%-80% in 
the industry) the sectoral R&D input of a country first increases with its 
technological advantage in the industry. When the country moves into the 
leading group (i.e., its technology frontier ranks among the top 20%-30% in 
the industry) its sector R&D begins to decrease with its technological 
advantage. This is consistent with Hicks’ claim that countries will first conduct 
export-biased technology improvements and then import-biased improvement. 
The empirical study, however, also finds that for the countries whose 
technological advantage ranks in bottom 20%-30% the sectoral R&D input 
decreases with their technological advantage. This might arise from the reason 
that less-developed countries may find it more profitable to rely on technology 
transfer than on research and development, a hypothesis left for future study.  
1.5. Organization of the Study 
Chapter 2 presents the first essay “Hicks Theorem: Effects of 
Technological Improvement in the Ricardian Model”. Chapter 3 presents the 
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second essay, “A Two-Sector Eaton and Kortum Model: Technological 
Changes and International Trade”. Chapter 4 presents the third essay, “Hicks 
Path: The Optimal Strategy of Technological Improvement in the open 
economy”.  Chapter 5 summarizes the study and suggests possible extensions 





Chapter 2 :  
HICKS THEOREM: EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
IMPROVEMENT IN THE RICARDIAN MODEL 
2.1. Introduction 
There is a great deal of interest in the effects of technological improvement 
(through either innovation or technology transfer) in developing countries, 
such as China and India, on the welfare of developed countries, such as the 
United States. In his recent article, Samuelson (2004) argues that China could 
improve the technology in its import sector until its post-innovation relative 
labor productivity is identical to that in the United States, thus eliminating the 
U.S.'s comparative advantage, and any further gains from free trade. 
Samuelson's argument, however, is challenged by the technology transfer 
paradox discussed by Ruffin and Jones (2007) and Jones and Ruffin (2008). 
They show that the United States will actually gain from technological 
improvement in China's import sector if such technological improvement is 
sufficiently large to reverse comparative advantage. Samuelson's argument is 
also quite different from studies by Eaton and Kortum (2001b, 2002, 2006) and 
by Alvarez and Lucas (2007), who argue that technological improvement in 
one country always benefits all other countries. 
Hicks (1953) pointed out these varying effects of technological 
improvement more than half a century ago. In analyzing the effects of 
increasing productivity in the United States on Britain, Hicks pointed out that: 
1) uniform technological improvement in one country benefits all countries, 
13 
 
which is the case studied by Eaton and Kortum (2001b, 2002, 2006) and 
Alvarez and Lucas (2007); 2) export-biased technological improvement 
benefits the foreign country, which is emphasized by Ruffin and Jones (2007) 
and Jones and Ruffin (2008); and 3) import-biased technological improvement 
hurts the foreign country, which is exactly Samuelson's argument. Hicks did 
not put his insight into a formal model. In this essay I will formally prove 
Hicks' insight with the Ricardian model. 
Even in the simplest two-good, two-country Ricardian model, a formal 
analysis could be complicated since patterns (regimes) of trade are 
endogenous. The problem with this model as a vehicle for discussing technical 
change is that too many things can happen (Krugman, 1986, p. 153). However, 
we are able to pin down regime switches in a simple diagram by assuming that 
the utility function is Cobb-Douglas. The analysis then becomes 
straightforward. 
The question that immediately emerges and that is crucial for economic 
development is: When will a country choose export-biased, and when will it 
choose import-biased technological improvement? Hicks (1953) proposed two 
stages of technological improvement: countries start with export-biased 
technological improvement in the first stage, and then move on to imp rt-
biased technological improvement in the second stage. We call this the Hicks
path.  
The optimal strategy of technological improvement in the Ricardian model 
14 
 
is studied here, in order to shed some light on the Hicks path. The essay shows 
that it is optimal for a small country to choose export-biased technological 
improvement, which benefits the partner country. A large country, however, 
finds it optimal to improve technology in both sectors. Interestingly, the 
optimal rate of technological improvement in each sector is proportional to the 
consumers' share of expenditure for that sector. Therefore, if the expenditure 
share of the import sector is larger than that of the export sector, the large 
country will choose a relatively import-biased technological improvement, 
which hurts its trade partner. When both countries are fully specialized, the 
home country may choose either an export-biased technological improvement, 
or a catching-up strategy, wherein it also improves the technology in its import 
sector and becomes self-sufficient in both goods. The catching-up strategy is 
shown to be optimal if the expenditure share on the importable good is 
sufficiently large, the country itself is large enough, and the technology gap 
with the advanced country in the import sector is relatively small. 
This paper is related to the theoretical literature that investigates 
technology and trade. Besides the aforementioned works, Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) provide an excellent survey of the literature. Helpman (1993) 
analyzes the welfare effect of intellectual property rights policy and argues that 
faster diffusion will stimulate the research process in the innovating country. 
Demidova (2006) shows that technological improvement hurts the innovator's 
partner in the event that specialization does not occur. 
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2.2. Welfare Effects of Technological Improvement 
The analysis of this paper is based upon the standard Ricardian model, 
which has two goods and one factor (labor). I assume that only the home 
country improves its technology. 
The goods market is perfectly competitive, and labor is perfectly mobile 
between industries in each country but immobile across countries1. In this 
essay, foreign variables are denoted by the superscript *. Let   be the 
amount of labor needed to produce a unit of good   (  1, 2) in the home 
(foreign) country before the technological change. Suppose the home country 
has comparative advantage is sector 1:  
/      /    
Thus, the home country has a comparative advantage in producing good 1 
before the technological change. The total labor force at home (abroad) is 
   Let    denote the autarky price of good 1 relative to good 2 in 
the home (foreign) country. Perfect competition implies that    / and      /. 
Now suppose that the home country and the foreign country open up to 
trade. Let  be the free trade price of each good, and    / be the 
                                                          
1 The assumptions of perfect competition in the good market and homogeneity 
of the final goods give rise to some sharp predictions concerning the trade 
pattern. For example, the supply elasticity of a good could be zero or infinity, a 
country either entirely depends on imports in a sector or does not import any 
good of that sector. The next essay will introduce heterogeneity to address 
some of these problems. 
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relative price of good 1. Output in sector  is denoted by .  Let good 2 be the 
numéraire good, so that    1. The world relative supply curve has a stepped 
shape, and is depicted in Figure 2-1. The vertical and horizontal axes represent 
relative price   and relative supply of good 1,      /   
respectively. For the world relative price      /       /  
both countries specialize in good 2, so the world relative supply of good 1 is 
zero. For       the home country specializes in good 1, while the 
foreign country specializes in good 2, and the world relative supply is ///. Finally, if       both countries specialize in good 1, and the 
world relative supply of good 1 is infinity. 
 
Figure 2-1: Regime Switch 










































same, and is represented by  
,    !  
Thus, the world relative demand is 
    "1 # "    "1 # " 
 
The free trade outcome is determined by the relative demand curve, and the 
relative supply curve. There are three possibilities. The first possibility s that 
the relative demand curve cuts the lower horizontal segment of the relative 
supply curve at    /  which is represented by equilibrium B in Figure 2-
1. This is referred to as regime B of trade in which the home country produces 
both goods, and exports good 1. The second possibility is that the demand 
curve cuts the vertical segment of the supply curve at      /   which is represented by equilibrium S in Figure 2-1. This is referred to as 
regime S of trade. Both countries are fully specialized in regime S. The third 
possibility is that the demand curve cuts the upper horizontal segment of the 
supply curve at    /    which is represented by equilibrium $ in Figure 
2-1. This is referred to as regime $  of trade, in which the foreign country 
produces both goods and exports good 2. It is easily seen that, in Figure 2-1 at  
%  ///  the inverse demand %   &'! ( ' must be less than / in regime B, greater than  / but less than  / in regime S, and 
greater than  / in regime $. 
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Let )   '! ' be the relative size of the foreign country. As shown in 
Figure 2-2, if  0 * )  ((  &&, the home country is relatively large, and the 
two countries are engaged in regime B trade; if  
((  )  && the two countries 
are engaged in regime S trade, and if  )  &&  (( the foreign country is 
relatively large, and the two countries are engaged in regime $ trade. The 
countries' relative sizes and their productivity determine the trade regime. 
 
Figure 2-2: Regime Switch and the Relative Country Size 
 
2.2.1. Regime Switch 
Changes in technology change the relative productivity of the two 
countries and thus may switch the trade regime. With the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function, the regime switch is conveniently determined by the countries' 
relative sizes. 
We analyze how the trade regime changes when the home country adopts 
export-biased, import-biased, or uniform technological improvements. In 
regime B, we have )+  ((  &&. The home country is large, produces both 
goods, and exports good 1. Export-biased technological improvement (which 
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reduces )  import-biased technological improvement (which reduces  )
and uniform technological improvement (which reduces    and   
proportionally), all leave the inequality  )+  ((  && unchanged. Hence, 
technological improvement in regime B does not switch the trade regime. 
In regime S,  
((  )%  &&  and the home country is completely specialized 
in producing good 1. A reduction in   (export-biased technological 
improvement) does not change the inequality, but a sufficiently large reduction 
in    (import-biased technological improvement) can switch the trade regime 
from S to B. If proportional reductions in both    and    (uniform 
technological improvement) are sufficiently large, the trade regime can also 
switch from S to B. 
In regime $, wherein  )  &&  ((  the home country is small and 
completely specializes in producing good 1, a sufficiently large export-biased 
technological improvement (reduction in  ), can switch the trade regime 
from $  to S. A sufficiently large import-biased technological improvement 
(reduction in  ), can first reverse the comparative advantage, and then switch 
the trade regime from $ to S. Finally, a sufficiently large uniform 
technological improvement (proportional reductions in  and  )  can switch 
the trade regime from $  to S. Further reductions in    and    can change 
the trade regime from S to B. The above results for regime switch are 
summarized in Table 2-1. 
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can switch the regime 
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No change Sufficiently large 
reduction in a2 can 




reductions in a1 and a2 
can switch regime 
from S to B 
Regime 
B 
No change No change No change 
Note: 
• Regime B*: Home country is small, specializes in good 1, exports good 
1; Foreign country is large, produces both goods, exports good 2 
• Regime S:  Home country specializes in good 1, exports good 1; 
Foreign country specializes in good 2, exports good 2 
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• Regime B: Home country is large, produces both goods, exports good 
1; Foreign country is small, specializes in good 2 
2.2.2. Welfare Effects 
I will first analyze the effects of export-biased technological improvement, 
then the effects of import-biased technological improvement, and lastly, the 
effects of uniform technological improvement. For each type of technological 
improvement, we start from regime B,  where  ) - &&  (( . The budget lines 
in the home country and the foreign country are 
    . 
    . 
Technological improvement changes the terms of trade,  , as well as real 
income, ./ and  ./. The former is denoted as the terms of trade effect and 
the later is denoted as the real income effect. In regime $ , the wage rates are 
.  / and  .  1/  and the free trade price is    / .  Consider an 
export-biased technological improvement that reduces    to  / . Real income 
at home increases but the terms of trade are not affected; therefore, the home 
country budget line shifts out. This change, however, has no effect on the 
budget line abroad. Thus, under regime  $ , the export-biased technological 
improvement increases welfare at home but has no effect on the foreign 
country. 
Let the reduction in    be sufficiently large so that the trade regime 
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switches from $  to S ( /  & ! ' ' ). When both countries are fully 
specialized, the world relative supply is    /// as indicated by 
point S in Figure 2-1. From the inverse demand function (1), the world relative 
price is now  /     &0 '! ( '. The terms of trade at home,   decline. 
The wage rates in the home country and in the foreign country are  . 
///   '! ( '  and .  1/  respectively. As    decreases, the real 
wage at home,  
12  & increases. Combining the r al income effect and the 
terms of trade effect, he budget line shifts out as    decreases. This implies 
that, in the home country, the r al income effect dominates the terms of trade 
effect, and domestic welfare increases. The reduction in    improves the 
terms of trade in the foreign country and swivels the foreign budget line out. 
Therefore, welfare in the foreign country increases as well. 
Note that a decrease in    in regime S never switches the trade regime 
from S to  B. On the other hand, if we start from regime B,   &(, .  2& 
( and .  (. The decrease in    swivels both the home and the foreign 
budget lines out, and therefore increases welfare at home and abroad.2 
We now turn to import-biased technological improvement. Note that in 
                                                          
2The above result relies on the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. If the demand is less elastic, as noted by both Samuelson (2004) and 





regimes $  and S, the reduction in    has no effect on the economy as long 
as the comparative advantage is not reversed. Once it does, one must have 
&&0  ((0 . If so, a further reduction in    becomes export-biased technological 
improvement; its welfare effect has been discussed above. In regime B,    &(   
.  2&  (  and  .  (.  Import-biased technological improvement 
increases both the wage rate and the terms of trade at home. The budget line 
shifts out and therefore improves welfare at home. However, the terms of trade 
in the foreign country,  1/, decline, while the foreign wage rate . is not 
affected by the reduction in   . The budget line for the foreign country shifts 
in, hence welfare in the foreign country decreases. 
Uniform technological improvement is a combination of export-biased and 
import-biased technological improvements. From the above analysis we know 
that welfare in both countries either improves or does not change for all cases 
except the import-biased technological improvement in regime B when foreign 
welfare declines. When uniform technological improvement in regime B takes 
place, however,   is equal to  / which does not change since   and    
decrease proportionally. This implies that welfare in the foreign country does 
not decline even in this worst case. Therefore, as expected, uniform 
technological improvement improves welfare in both home and foreign 
countries. The above cases of welfare effects are summarized in Table 2-2, and 
are also states as the following Hicks theorem: 
 Theorem 1(Hicks Theorem): If the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, 
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export-biased technological improvement at home benefits the home 
country, and either benefits the foreign country (or leaves its welfare 
unchanged). Import-biased technological improvement at home benefits 
the home country, but can hurt the foreign country as long as the 
comparative advantage is not reversed. Uniform technological 
improvement at home benefits all countries (or leaves welfare unchanged). 
The above results were first stated by Hicks (1953) while analyzing the 
effect that increased U.S. productivity had on Britain. His main insight was 
that, given the terms of trade, the primary effect of technological progress is to 
increase the growing country's income and leave the foreign one unaffected, an 
effect summarized as the r al income effect. When the terms of trade are 
endogenous, there is a secondary effect, which is labeled as the terms of trade 
effect. Export-biased technological progress lowers the world price of the 
exported good at home, which hurts the home country but benefits its trading 
partner. The primary gain to the home country will dominate the secondary 
loss if demand is sufficiently elastic. The Cobb-Douglas case assumed in this 
paper is enough to guarantee that the gain is greater than the loss. Import-
biased technological improvement changes the terms of trade in favor of the 
home country, so the home country may enjoy further gain, but the foreign 
country can be hurt. 
Fifty years after Hicks, Samuelson (2004) again addresses the unpleasant 
effect of import-biased technological improvement on the foreign country. His 
argument, however, is challenged by the technology transfer paradox discussed 
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by Ruffin and Jones (2007) and Jones and Ruffin (2008). They show that the 
United States will, nonetheless, gain from China's technological improvement 
in its import sector if such technological improvement is sufficiently large to 
reverse comparative advantage. Jones and Ruffin point out a complication to 
the formal analysis: trade regimes become endogenous when technology is 
changing. The paper shows that Hicks' insight still works, provided that the 
technological improvement is mport-biased up to the point where comparative 
advantage is reversed. 
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improves worsens unchanged 
Note: 
• Regime B*: Home country is small, specializes in good 1, exports good 
1; Foreign country is large, produces both goods, exports good 2 
• Regime S:  Home country specializes in good 1, exports good 1; 
Foreign country specializes in good 2, exports good 2 
• Regime B: Home country is large, produces both goods, exports good 
1; Foreign country is small, specializes in good 2 
2.3. Optimal Strategy of Technological Improvement 
The effects of export-biased versus import-biased technological 
improvements on welfare of the partner country are strikingly opposite. A 
crucial question that follows is when a country will choose the export-biased 
and when it will choose import-biased technological improvement. To answer 
this question, this section investigates the optimal strategy of technological 
improvement. 
Departing from the assumption of costless technological improvement, I 
assume that the home country must allocate some labor to improve its 
technology. After the technological improvement the amount of labor needed 
to produce one unit of output in sector    is 
/  1  34 
27 
 
where  4  0 is the amount of labor used in sector    for technological 
improvement.  3  0  measures the efficiency of R&D in sector   , which is 
assumed, for simplicity, to be the same in both sectors. I start from a social 
planner's problem in which  4, 4 is chosen to maximize the utility of the 
representative consumer. The social planner can pay  .4  4   to the 
foreign country for a technology transfer, which is typically the case for 
developing countries, or she can spend  
56'  share of labor per worker in sector    
to improve working efficiency. Either way, the total income left for 
consumption after technological improvement at home is  . # 4 # 4. It 
can be shown that the social planner's problem is equivalent to a decentralized 
market decision when the R&D sector is perfectly competitive (see Appendix 
2.A). 
2.3.1. The Social Planner's Problem in a Large Country 
We start from the regime B equilibrium, where the home country is large 
and produces both goods, and the world price    quals the autarky price at 
home,  /. Regime B is an important case for us, since it resembles the 
optimal R&D decision in autarky. It is also a simple one since technological 
improvement does not change the trade regime in this case. First the 
representative consumer chooses a consumption bundle  ,  given R&D 
input  4, 4  and prices  , .; then the social planner chooses the R&D 
input  4, 4  to maximize utility. Using the envelope theorem, it is 
straightforward to show that this two-stage maximization problem is equivalent 
to the social planner's problem of maximizing utility by choosing  
28 
 
, , 4, 4  that is, 
max:&,:(,5&,5( ,    !  
;. <.     . # 4 # 4=4 
  ./  .1  34  >?@   1,2  
where the first constraint is the budget constraint, while the second constraint 
is the equilibrium pricing condition. Substituting the price into the budget 
constraint, the first-order conditions are then given by 
A, A  B 
.  .A/A4  0 
where  B is the Lagrange multiplier. Note that the social planner is constrained 
by the market wage rate  .  and equilibrium price. 
The second FOC highlights the costs and benefits of R&D. The first term 
in it is the marginal cost of R&D, while the second term is the marginal gain. 
The optimal level of R&D for sector   depends on both the research 
productivity  3 , and the equilibrium output  . The higher the research 
productivity, the larger the marginal gain. Since one unit of ideas benefits    
units of output, the more the equilibrium output   the larger the marginal 
benefit. If the consumer's expenditure share in sector    is larger, or the 
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country is more specialized in sector    (producing more    than the autarky 
output) in an open economy, the research input for sector    will be greater. It 
is interesting to note that the above results are very different from the 
conclusion reached by Eaton and Kortum (2001b, page 15, in their studies of 
uniform technological improvement) that “...research intensity does not depend 
on country size, research productivity, or openness” .  
Solving the first-order condition gives optimal R&D inputs:3 
4+  "3 # 21 # "23 , 4+  1 # "3 # 2"23  
Substituting the last two equations into equation /  6CD56 yields the 
optimal technology: 
/  23  2"  =4 /  23  21 # " 
The optimal rates of technological improvement, defined as  &&0 , ((0  are 
proportional to consumers' expenditure share  ", 1 # ". That is, it is optimal 
to improve technology at a higher rate in the sector on which consumers spend 
more. 
In trade regime B, sector 2 is the import sector at home. If  "  , the 
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optimal strategy is relatively import-biased. The world relative price after 
technical progress at home is  
//   1 # ""    
which implies that the terms of trade in the foreign country deteriorate. 
Therefore, welfare in the foreign country decreases. 
2.3.2. The Case of a Small Country 
We now turn to regime $, in which the home country is a small country. 
Under this regime, technological changes in the home country may lead to 
regime changes. Also, it is possible for the home country to improve its 
technology to such an extent that it becomes a large country. If so, the 
equilibrium moves from regime $  to regime S, or even regime B. Thus, a 
complete analysis will require comparing the welfare levels in each possible 
regime. For simplicity, suppose that the home country remains a small country 
after the technological improvement. However, it is allowed to reverse its 
comparative advantage by investing in R&D in the import sector. Such an 
import-biased technological improvement, however, is not optimal, as I will 
show below. 
If export-biased technological improvement is chosen, the home country 
specializes in producing good 1. The budget constraint becomes     . # 4 , and the post-improvement technology parameters are 




4+  3 # 123  
Investment in R&D in the import sector is useless unless it is specialized in 
sector 2 after technological progress. Assuming it does so, we have  / 
(CD5(  and  /  .  The optimal solution is 
4+  3 # 123  
 
For import-biased technological improvement to be effective, the home 
country must reverse its comparative advantage. If  4+ is not sufficiently 
large to accomplish this, the home country needs to input  4  4+  to 
improve technology in sector 2. Nevertheless, E4+F, E4+F  is the 
highest utility that can be reached if import-biased technological improvement 
is chosen. 
Substituting 4+ and 4+ into the indirect utility function, we have E4+F, E4+FE4+F, E4+F    1  
 
The above inequality comes from the comparative advantage assumption. 
Thus, import-biased technological improvement cannot be optimal for a small 
country. 
A few remarks are in order. First, the optimal R&D input in the large and 
the small country clearly indicate that the home country should invest more in 
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R&D if its research productivity is higher. Second, research intensity is related 
to openness. Consider a thought experiment in which a small home country 
moves from autarky to free trade. It invests  4+ in autarky in sector but 4+ in 
free trade. The result indicates that  4+  4+,  that is, trade openness leads the 
country to do more research in the sector in which it is more specialized. 
Finally,  4+/   in the large-country case and  4+/  in the small-country case 
are all increasing in  .  Therefore, it is optimal for larger countries to invest 
more in R&D per capita. Summarizing the above results, we have: 
 Theorem 2. Research input increases with research efficiency. In an open 
economy, countries do more research in the sector in which they are more 
specialized. Larger countries invest more in R&D per capita. B) For a 
small country, it is optimal to choose export-biased technological 
improvement, which benefits the foreign country. C) The optimal strategy 
for a large country, however, is to improve the technology at a higher rate 
in the sector on which consumers spend more. It hurts the foreign country 
if consumers at home spend more on the importable good. 
R&D per capita is determined by the first-order condition derived above. 
Dividing both sides of the condition by  , we have 
.  # . A/A4  4  G1 # 4 H I  # 4/>4J  K# 4A>4>4A4L 
 4  MΦ41  MΦ4 
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where  >4  CD56 is the production function of R&D, M  :6'!56/O56 
is the output per effective labor in production sectors, and is a constant.  
Φ4  # 56PO56O56P56  is the elasticity of R&D with respect to the labor input. 
The marginal cost of R&D per capita, 
1' , reduces proportionally to the increase 
in country size  . Whether optimal R&D per capita increases depends, 
therefore, on whether the marginal benefit of R&D increases more than 
proportionally to the increase in  . As country size    becomes larger, R&D 
input  4  increases. If  Φ4  increases in  4  which holds in the setup since  
Φ4  D56CD56  R&D per capita,  56' , must rise as  4 increases. 
In summary, R&D elasticity  Φ4  determines R&D per capita. When  Φ4  is an increasing (constant, or decreasing) function of R&D input, the 
marginal benefit of R&D increases more than proportionally (proportionally, 
or less than proportionally) to the increase in country size. This implies that 
optimal R&D per capita increases (remains constant, or decreases) as the 
country becomes larger. Eaton and Kortum (2001b, 2006) study R&D intensity 
in steady state growth and conclude that research intensity does not depend on 
country size. Their result may be viewed as a limit of this static model. Note 
that, in the limit   Q ∞, the R&D per capita in this paper also converges to 
a constant. 
2.3.3. When Will a Catching-Up Strategy Be Optimal? 
When both countries are specialized, each country produces one good 
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while importing the other good. If a country chooses import-biased 
improvements so that it will produce both goods in the new equilibrium, then 
we say that the country is following a c tching-up strategy(or import-
substitution strategy for growth).  
As we have discussed in Section 2.2.1, 
(( * )   '! '  && in regime S, 
and the home country is completely specialized in producing good 1. The 
home country can choose to reduce  , which does not change the trade 
regime. On the other hand, a sufficiently large import-biased technological 
improvement (reduction in  )  can switch the trade regime from S to B. 
Within the regime B trade, the R&D input of the home country is that derive in 
section 2.3.1, which is labeled as a catching-up strategy.  
Instead of completely relying on imports in sector 2, the home country may 
want to catch up in the import sector and become self-sufficient in both goods.4 
The export-biased strategy has an adverse terms-of-trade effect. Moreover,  
.  1:6P60P56  0 indicates that the marginal benefit of R&D in sector 1 declines. 
On the other hand, import-biased technical progress improves the terms of 
trade, but the labor spent in filling the gap between  
((  and  )   '! ' has no 
                                                          
4The catching-up strategy has been a controversial policy in economic 
development. On the one hand, implementations of the catching-up strategy in 
1950s and 1960s by many developing countries are generally not viewed as 
successful; on the other hand, the success of the catching-up strategy used in 





effect on the economy and is therefore a waste of resources. On the demand 
side, technological improvement in sector 2 is more desirable if consumer's 
expenditure share in good 2,  1 # ",  is larger. A set of sufficient conditions 
are derived in Appendix 2.B, summarized as follows: 
"  0.3494 
  21 # "3"  




V  1 # "4"3 K" 3  23  1 L/!  
 
The second and third conditions ensure that the distance between  
((  a d  
)   '! '  is not too large, so that the catching-up strategy is not too costly, 
while the first condition requires that the import sector be sufficiently large. 
Summarizing, we have the following 
 Theorem 3: When both countries are fully specialized, the catching-up 
strategy is optimal if the expenditure share in the import sector is 
sufficiently large, the country is relatively large, and the technology in the 
import sector is relatively advanced. 
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2.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
In analyzing the United States' technological improvement in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hicks proposed two stages of technological 
improvement: “countries start with export-biased technological improvement, 
and then ... the process passes into its second stage”— notice that it is still a 
stage of development for the world economy, taken as a whole — “in which 
the lead is taken by new centers, which are now making improvements that are 
import-biased” (Hicks 1953, pp 130). Hicks noticed that Western Europe was 
not the first metropolis of trade and industry that had suffered from 
competition from new lands: the same elements were present in the decline of 
some ancient empires and in the rise of Britain at the expense of the Flemish 
and Italian centers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Hicks' two-stage 
path in technological improvement seems to be not just a historical 
phenomenon. Are emerging markets like China and India still in Hicks' first 
stage of development now? Will emerging markets move to the second stage? 
If so, when will they move? What will be the effect on the existing centers in 
this globalized age if emerging markets do move on to the second stage? This 
analysis is only a beginning in the explanation of these extremely important 
issues. 
To simplify the analysis, the essay makes some restrictive assumptions. 
Although the Cobb-Douglas utility function is not essential to the results of 
this paper, it helps to keep the analysis tractable. The essay also assumes a 
simple R&D function and that the efficiency of R&D is identical across 
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sectors. The strategic interactions in R&D between the two countries are not 
studied. The essay does not consider imperfect competition, firm 
heterogeneity, or trade costs. The hard part of this analysis is the discrete 
change of trade regimes. Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas 
(2007) provide a tractable continuum version of the Ricardian model. It would 
be worthwhile to investigate the optimal strategy in their version of the 
Ricardian model. Finally, the model shows that a small country should choose 
export-biased improvements while many of them choose import-substitution 
improvements in the real world. This is mainly because the classical model that 
we use here is a static model that dispenses with the dynamic gains and 
spillovers that come with import-substitution improvements. In the future 
research, I will incorporate these factors in my analysis. 
2.5. Appendices 
2.5.1. Appendix 2.A 
This appendix shows that the social planner's optimal strategy for 
technological improvement is equivalent to the decentralized market decision 
when the R&D sector is perfectly competitive. 
Consider an R&D sector that produces ideas. Firms in the R&D sector sell 
= ideas to manufacturing firms in sector  . Let the production function for 
ideas be =  34, where  3  measures research productivity and is assumed to 




/  1  = 
The R&D firms charge a royalty of @= per unit of output produced in 
sector  .  The total cost for firms in sector   , therefore, becomes 
W  @=  ./  @=  ./ 
Firms in sector    choose the number of ideas,  =,  to minimize the 
marginal cost of production, which gives the first order condition as follows: 
@  .A/A=  0 
Let there be free entry and exit in the R&D sector so firms earn zero profit;
this requires  
@= # .4  X@ # .3 Y =  0 
Substituting zero-profit condition into the first order condition and noting 
that  =  34, we immediately see that the above equilibrium condition are 
the same as the one with a social planner are identical. Now, manufacturing 
firms set the goods price equal to the marginal cost so that  
Z  @=  ./ 
Applying it to the budget constraint and noting that workers in the R&D 
sector and manufacturing sectors all earn wage  . , we have 
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Z  Z  . * 
./   ./   . # 4 # 4 
In a decentralized market, the consumer's first-order condition is the same 
as the one with a social planner. It can be clearly seen, therefore, that the 
equilibrium conditions in the decentralized market, are identical to that in the 
social planner's problem. 
2.5.2. Appendix 2.B 
This appendix derives sufficient conditions for the catching-up strategy to 
be optimal in regime S trade. Conditions under which the catching-up strategy 
is optimal are 
  "1 # "   
  1 # "3  24"3  
  max [21 # "3" , 2"31 # "\ 
+4+, 4+  ]4] 
 
The first inequality ensures that the trade regime is S. The second one 
makes sure that the trade regime switches from S to B. The third one ensures 
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that the country improves technology in both sectors. The last one requires that 
the utility of the catching-up strategy be greater than that of the export-biased 
strategy. The utility of the export-biased strategy can be derived as 
]4  "!  !   # 4 1  34  
Maximizing  ]4  we obtain the optimal R&D input,  4]  D'!D  . With 
some computations, condition +4+, 4+  ]4]can be written as 
+4+, 4+]4]  " !1 # "! 
! 3  23! ! 2! 3  1  1 
The first two conditions and the last condition are combined as 
 # ""    1 # "4"3 min `3  2, a" 3  23  1 b
! c 
 
It can be shown that the first term in the curvy brackets is greater than the 
second one, so that a sufficient condition for the above inequality is  
 # ""    1 # "4"3 a" 3  23  1 b
! 
 
 !    V  
In order for the above condition to hold, we must have  !  V   
Computations reveal that it is so if  "  0.3494  which proves that the 
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conditions given in section 2.3.3 are sufficient conditions for the conditions at 
the beginning of this appendix. When  "  0.3494 it can be easily shown that  






Chapter 3 : 
 A TWO-SECTOR EATON AND KORTUM MODEL: 




For centuries, trade theorists have assumed that firms in a sector were 
homogeneous, as seen in the standard Ricardian model, the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, and the new trade theory. Beginning with Bernard and Jensen (1995, 
1999, 2001) and continuing with other economists (e.g., Clerides, Lach and 
Tybout 1998; Aw, Chung, and Roberts 2000, Cabral and Mata 2003), recent 
research nonetheless calls our attention to the existence of large and persistent 
differences among firms in terms of size as well in terms of productivity and 
trade behavior. Coupled with other facts, firm heterogeneity breaks down the 
firms of a sector into a small group of relatively productive exporters and a 
majority of less productive firms that only serve the domestic markets, leading 
to many other stylized facts that were neglected in previous trade theories.  
In response, the so-called “new new” trade theory has been developed to 
incorporate the firm level differences (e.g., Eaton and Kortum 2001b, 2002, 
2006; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2003; Melitz 2003; Helpman, Melitz 
and Yeaple 2004; Yeaple 2005; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2006; Alvarez 
and Lucas 2007; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). Papers following Melitz (2003) 
predict intra-industry reallocation during trade liberalization stemming from
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firm heterogeneity and fixed trade costs, with Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 
(2006) further arguing that the reallocations may affect the growth of 
economies by changing the marginal cost of R&D. Papers following Eaton and 
Kortum’s framework adopt a realistic yet tractable parameterization of the firm 
level heterogeneity and are able to carry out more detailed general equilibrium 
analysis.  
Fruitful as it is, “more recent research on heterogeneous firms … ignores 
comparative advantage by considering just a single factor and industry” 
(Bernard, Redding and Schott 2007, pp. 31). This neglect may prevent us from 
a complete view of the international trade since comparative advantage is on  
of the pillars of the traditional trade theory. In response, Bernard, Redding and 
Schott (2007) extend Melitz’s model into a two-sector, two-factor framework. 
Their paper analyzes how heterogeneity and endowment comparative 
advantage jointly determines the effects of trade liberalizations and highlights 
the additional welfare gains arising from the amplification effect of 
heterogeneity on comparative advantage.  
Besides Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007), Costinot and Komunjer 
(2007), and Fieler (2008) also employ multi-sector heterogeneous-firm models 
to analyze international trade. Costinot and Komunjer (2007) demonstrate that 
the Ricardian predictions of trade pattern are empirically relevant if we 
introduce firm heterogeneity to a multi-sector, multi-country model. Assuming 
a non-homothetic utility function, Fieler (2008) shows that heterogeneity in 
technology affects the comparative advantage through the income elasticity 
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and thereby explains the relationship between per capita income, country size, 
and the trade pattern. 
The marriage between firm heterogeneity and comparative advantage 
opens a door to a better understanding of world trade, yet there are many 
questions left open. In this paper I analyze how changes in productivity 
dispersion and average levels affect intra-industry trade and inter-industry 
trade, total trade volume. To the best of my knowledge, no economists have 
studied this before. The model also studies the welfare effects of technological 
improvements. 
Based on a two-sector Eaton and Kortum model, this paper shows that 
technology improvements always increase the total trade. This increase inter-
industry trade if they originate in the comparative advantage sector, otherwise 
it decreases inter-industry trade. Increases in the degree of heterogen ity 
always increase total trade and inter-industry trade. 
The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of technology improvements 
and yields some new results. It shows that with the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function technology improvements are always beneficial to the innovator. In 
agreement with the literature, export-biased improvements benefit the foreign 
country.  In a departure from the literature, however, the paper shows that 
import-biased improvements could benefit the foreign country. The paper also 




The theoretical model of the paper shows that the net exports of the 
comparative advantage sector are positive while those of the other sector are 
negative. This offers us a testable hypothesis about the Ricardian trade model. 
Using the OECD STAN databases, the paper conducts some simple tests 
concerning the prediction and finds strong support for it. The Ricardian model 
is one of the pillars of the international trade theory. To the best of my 
knowledge, however, only Bernhofen (2004) and Costinot and Komunjer 
(2007) successfully test the Ricardian model. The results of this work will 
greatly enrich the literature in this field.  
3.2. The Model 
This section extends the model developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and 
Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to a model with two sectors. Following the standard 
Ricardian model, I assume there are only two countries: the home country (h) 
and the foreign country (f), whose labor endowments are dand O 
respectively.  The economies produce two final goods: good 1 and good 2. 
Consumers in the two countries have the same preferences over the final 
goods, and their utility function is5: 
ef, f  f&f( 
where fis the quantity of the final good of sector    1,2 and  is the 
expenditure share of good  with  g 0,1,      1. Throughout this 
                                                          
5 It is a strong assumption to assume identical preferences across countries. 
However, if we are only concerned with developed countries, the assumption 
may become sensible. In fact, this paper uses a dataset of OECD countries to 
test the prediction of the theoretical model.  
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paper, subscripts are used to denote either country or industry. (Please refer to 
Appendix 3.A for definitions of variables.) 
The final good of each sector is produced with intermediate goods that can 
only be used in that sector. Following Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson 
(1977) I assume that in each sector there is a continuum of intermediate goods 
indexed by  g h0,1i . Firms in both countries can use the intermediate goods 
to produce the final goods with the following technology: 
f  aj k!/l4m b
l/l! ,   1,2 
where k is the amount of intermediate good  of sector  and n is the 
elasticity of substitution. 
Intermediate goods are produced by labor with constant-returns-to-scale 
technology. All firms in a country have access to the best technology available 
in the country and the productivity varies across varieties. With one unit of 
labor, the home (foreign) country firms can produce d!D  units (O!D  
units) of variety u in industry i, where d!D  (or O!D ) as a whole denotes 
the productivity associated with variety  in the home (foreign) country, where 
3 is a positive number. 
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I assume that d  is distributed 
independently and exponentially with parameter Bd in the home country (BO 
in the foreign country).  
od  1 # p!q6r:6r , )d  1/Bd 
This is equivalent to a Fréchet distribution in Eaton and Kortum (2002).  
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I assume that the intermediate goods are tradable. For simplicity, I assume 
that trade is costless. The final good is not tradable. The labor is immobile 
across countries, but perfectly mobile within a country and across industries. 
3.3. Equilibrium 
This section solves the equilibrium of the world economy. Given the 
technology levels and trade barriers, whether a country produces a variety is 
determined by the relative wage. The exports and the imports of a country are 
therefore functions of the relative wage. Assuming trade balance, the relative 
wage is determined and so are other equilibrium variables. 
Since the procedure of solving the equilibrium is similar to that in Alvarez 
and Lucas (2007), I will relegate most of it to the appendix. Throughout this 
paper, the wage rate in the home country is assumed to be higher and the labor 
in the foreign country is used as the numéraire. 
3.3.1. Price Indices of the Final Goods 
I will use the home country’s trade balance condition to solve the 
equilibrium. It turns out that the imports (d) and exports (d) of the home 
country can be conveniently denoted as functions of price indices of the final 
goods. Appendix 3.B shows that the price index of the final good of sector  is: 
td  uvd!D.d 
In the above expression, u is a constant and equals 
Ew xD!lp!y4xzm F/!l, where x is the variable of integration. Following 
Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I assume 1  31 # n  0 to guarantee the 
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integral converges. vd  Bd  BO.d/D/.O/D is a weighted average of the 
technologies of two countries.  It is the world technology perceived by 
consumers in the home country, and therefore is called the “consumer-
perceived” technology level of sector  in the home country. For ease in 
writing, I define, {d  .d/.O  and |d  .d/D/.O/D. Then we have vd 
Bd  BO|d (and vO  BO  Bd/|d).  Likewise, the price of good  in the 
foreign country is: 
tO  uvO!D.O 
3.3.2. Imports and Exports 
The value of the final good  consumed in the home country is equal to 
tdfd. Since the market of final goods is perfectly competitive, dfd equals 
the value of the intermediate goods used as input. Let }d denote the share of 
intermediate goods in sector  that the home country imports from the foreign 
country. Then the imports of the home country in sector  are: 
sd  }dtdfd 
In Appendix 3.C, I show that 
}d  BO|dvd  
where BO|d is the foreign country’s technology level perceived by 
consumers in the home country. The higher it is, the greater is }d. 
Given the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we have: 
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sd  BO|dDCd.OBd  BO|d  
For notational clarity, let ~d  Bd/BO denote the advantage the home 
country in sector . Then we have: 
sd  |dDCd.O~d  |d  
Therefore, the imports of the home country are: 
sd  G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH |dDCd.O 
Since 3  0, sdis increasing in |d(a monotonic transformation of the 
relative wage rate), keeping everything else constant (Figure 3-1).  
The sector  exports of the home country (d) equal the sector  imports of 
foreign country ( sO), so the total exports of the home country are: 
d  G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH O.O 
The above equation shows that the exports of the home country decrease 
with the relative wage rate (Figure 3-1). 
3.3.3. Equilibrium 
Suppose the trade balances in equilibrium: 
O G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH  G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH d|dDC 
The above condition defines the relative wage rate. The following graph 
shows that there exists a unique equilibrium relative wage. Since the price 
indices of final goods, the imports and the exports of both countries are 





The equilibrium condition shows that ceteris paribus, the relative wage rate 
({d  .d/.O) decreases with the size of the home country while it increases 
with the size of the foreign country.  
Given the relative wage rate {d , the price of variety  is determined by the 
(wage-weighted) best productivity draw in two countries. If the home country 
has the (wage-weighted) best productivity draw d for variety , that is, 
d  O/{d/D, , then the price of it is: 
  .dd!D  .O{dd!D   .O{ddD 
Given the CES demand function, the quantity of variety  supplied is: 
k  !ltd!ld.d  O.O 
Write all equilibrium variables in terms of .O and {d, we have: 
k  EdF!aEd  O/{dFGuXBd  BO{d/DY!DH!l  
Trade 
Volumes d{d sd{d 
{d {d   
d{d  
Figure 3-1: Equilibrium 
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If the foreign country has the (wage-weighted) best productivity draw  
for variety , that is, d  O/{d/D, then the price of it is: 
  .Od!D  .Od!D   .Od 
Likewise, the equilibrium quantity of variety  is: 
k  EdF!lEd.O{d  O.OFGuXBd  BO{d/DY!DH!l  
3.4. Technological Improvements and Trade Patterns 
This section analyzes the effects of changes in the levels of technology. 
Throughout this section I assume that only the technology of sector 1 in the 
home country increases (Bd ). The technological improvement is assumed to 
be exogenous, instantaneous and costless.  
3.4.1. Effects on Inter-Industry Trade 
This section studies the effects of technology improvements on inter-
industry trade. Following Grudel and Lloyd (1975), inter-industry trade is 
defined as absolute value of the net exports of one sector in one country. In this 












Figure 3-2: Trade Flows 
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The standard Ricardian model predicts that countries will export goods of 
one sector and import goods of the other sector. This complete specialization is 
never observed in the real world (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995), but it does not 
mean that comparative advantage theory has lost its predictive power 
altogether. The Ricardian predictions of trade patterns remain sensible if we 
interpret it as saying that the net exports of the comparative advantage sector 
are relatively larger while that of the other sector relatively smaller.  
Costinot and Komunjer (2007) study a similar question. They prove that 
total exports of a sector and the sectoral productivity should be positive 
correlated, which is support by their empirical study. However, they do not 
check the relationship between comparative advantage and net exports. In this 
essay, I examine how comparative advantage is related to the direction of net 
exports here. Note that  
d  #d  .O |dDCd # ~dO~d  |d  
Consider an increase in Bd. From the equilibrium condition we know that 
the relative wage rate ({d increases with ~d, so  |d  increases. This implies 
that d increases with Bd. Therefore net inter-industry trade increases after 
a technology improvement if it originates in the comparative advantage sector. 
Now let us consider the case in which ~d  ~d. The net exports of sector 
1 are: 
d  .O a ~dO|d  ~d # |dDCd~d  |db 
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Substituting this and ~d  ~d into the trade balance condition (d #d) yields: 
d  #d  #/d 
This equality must hold for all  g 0,1, so we must have d  0. 
Since the net export of sector 1 increases with Bd, the net exports of sector 1 
must be positive if ~d  ~d. This gives us clear predictions about inter-
industry trade pattern:  the cross-country difference in the productivity of two 
sectors determines inter-industry trade. This corresponds to Krugman and 
Helpman’s (1985) conclusion in a differentiated-product Heckscher-Ohlin 
model: “despite the existence of intra-industry trade inter-industry pattern of 
trade is determined by the cross-country difference in the relative factor 
endowments, just as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model”. Their result and mine 
imply that inter-industry trade patterns are determined by the comparative 
advantage, no matter the comparative advantage arises from the difference in 
productivity or endowments. 
d  0 when sector 1 is has comparative disadvantage (~d  ~d). 
Since 
5&r5q&r  0, that mean the absolute value of d will decrease with Bd. 
Likewise, the absolute value of d increases Bd increases with Bd when 
sector 1 is has comparative advantage (~d  ~d). This means that export-
biased technological improvements will increase inter-industry trade and 
import-biased improvements decrease inter-industry trade. 
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3.4.2. Effects on Total Trade 
This section studies the relationship between technology levels and the 
total trade volume, which is defined as the total exports of the home country. 
World trade volume is defined as the exports of the home country, d 
X &&rrC&r  ((rrC(rY O.O. Calculations show (Appendix 3.D): 4d4~d  Φ3d|dD G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH  0 
where Φ is a positive constant. The above results do not depend on the 
relative magnitude of ~d and ~d, so technology improvements always 
increase world trade no matter how it changes the comparative advantage 
pattern. 
3.4.3. Effects on Intra-industry Trade 
This section analyzes the effect of technological improvements on intra-
industry trade. Following Grudel and Lloyd (1975), intra-industry trade is 
defined as the difference between the gross trade (d) and inter-industry trade. 
Suppose the net exports of sector 1 are positive for the home country (d #sd  0), then the world intra-industry trade is 
d # d # sd  d  sd  O~d.O|d  ~d  |dDCd.O~d  |d  
 Sector 1is assumed to be the home country’s comparative advantage 
sector. Then increase in Bd enlarges comparative advantage (~d/~d ). 
Following the steps used in the previous section, it can be shown show that the 
derivative of intra-industry trade with respect to ~d is: 
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4d  sd4~d  Φ 3|dD –  a2|dD  |dDd/O  O/d~d  |d
 3|dD~d d/Ob 
where Φ is a positive number6. Note that only the first term in the 
parenthesis of the right hand side is positive. Generally speaking, when  is 
small enough, the first term is dominated by other terms and 
5(rC&r5&r  will be 
negative; when  is large enough, it is dominated by other terms and 
5(rC&r5&r  will be positive. Simulations confirm these conclusions and show 
that intra-industry trade decreases with comparative advantage in most cases. 
Summarizing, we have the following theorem: 
Theorem 1. In a two-sector EK model, the net exports of the 
comparative advantage sector of a country are positive and those of the 
other sector are negative. The total trade volume always increases with 
technology improvements. Inter-industry trade increases with export-
biased improvements and decreases with import-biased improvement. 
3.5. Changes in the Degree of Heterogeneity and Trade Patterns 
Trade theorists have been modeling firm heterogeneity for a while, yet 
there has not been systematic analysis of its effects on trade patterns. A two-
                                                          
6 Through out this essay, I use Φ to denote different positive constants. We are 
note interested in the actual value of these constants so I use the same notation 
to avoid too many symbols. 
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sector Eaton and Kortum model differs from the standard Ricardian model  by 
introducing firm level heterogeneity and therefore is a good framework to 
study the effects of changes in heterogeneity. This section studies how inter-
industry trade, the total trade volume and intra-industry trade vary with the 
degree of firm heterogeneity.  
3.5.1.     Effects on Inter-Industry Trade 
Now let us look at the effect of the degree of heterogeneity on inter-
industry trade. Suppose the home country has comparative advantage in sector 
1, then inter-industry trade is equal to the net exports of sector 1 of the home 
country (d): 
d  .O a ~dO|d  ~d # |dDCd~d  |db 
Consider the trade balance condition: 
d  G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH O.O # G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH d|dDC.O 0 
Applying the implicit functional theorem on the trade balance condition 
yields: 
4|d43  # X
~d  |d  ~d  |dY d|dDC.O=|
G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH E1  |dDFO.O3 X ~d  |d  ~d  |dY d|dD.O 
 0 
Plugging it in 
56r5D  yields: 
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4d43  Φd # sd  sd # d/ 
Due to trade balance, we have d # sd  sd # d, therefore we have: 
4d43  Φd # sd1  / 
Sector 1 is assumed to be the comparative advantage sector of the home 
country, so d # sd  0. Therefore 5&r5D  0, which implies that  inter-
industry trade increases with the degree of heterogeneity. 
3.5.2.    Effects on the Total Trade Volume 
This section studies the relationship between firm heterogeneity and the 
total trade volume of the world. World trade volume is the exports of the home 
country ( d  X &&rrC&r  ((rrC(rY O.O). Heterogeneity (3) affects the total 
trade volume solely through the relative wage rate since it is not an explicit 
argument of d.  
4d43  4d4|d · 4|d43  
It can be shown that  
4d4|d  # G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH O.O  0 
In the previous section I showed that 
5r5D  0, therefore  
4d43  4d4|d · 4|d43  0 
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which implies that world trade volume increases with the degree of 
heterogeneity.  
3.5.3.    Effects on Intra-Industry Trade 
Due to the homogeneity in the standard Ricardian model, a country either 
produces all the goods of a sector on its own or completely relies on imports 
from the foreign country. This sharp prediction excludes the possibility of 
intra-industry trade altogether, a phenomenon that is actually prevalent in the 
real world.  
Krugman (1979) explains intra-industry trade with increasing returns to 
scale.  Due to increasing returns to scale, it is optimal for each firm to produce 
a differentiated variety even though they have access to the same technology. 
Each country imports the varieties produced abroad because of consumers’ 
love of variety. In a two-sector Eaton and Kortum model the returns to scale 
are constant and the mass of variety is fixed. A country’s productivity varies 
across varieties in a sector. As a result, the country is competitive enough on 
some varieties and exports them, and for other varieties the home country is 
less competitive and imports them. Put differently, intra-industry trade in the 
two-sector Eaton and Kortum model is due to intra-industry comparative 
advantage that arises from firm heterogeneity. 
Eaton and Korgum (2002) define the degree of heterogeneity (3 in this 
paper) as the level of comparative advantage in their one sector model. In this 
two-sector version of their model, heterogeneity should be explained as the 
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degree of intra-industry comparative advantage. In what follows, I will study 
how changes in heterogeneity affect intra-industry trade. 
The derivative of intra-industry trade with respect to the degree of 
heterogeneity is: 
4d  sd43  |dDCd.O~d  |d =|d  Ad  sdA|d 4|d43  
Since |d  1, the direct effect is positive (&r&'r1&rCr =|d). The indirect 
effect functions through the relative wage rate and it could be positive or 
negative. Calculations show that: 
4d  sd43  Φ a O.O~d  |d ~d|d  ~d  2~d # ~d|d  ~d O.O|d  ~d d # sd|d  ~d  a O~d.O|d  ~d  |dDCd.O~d  |d b ~d  |db 
where Φ is a positive number. Suppose the home country has comparative 
advantage in sector 1. Then among all the terms in the parenthesis on the right 
hand side of the equation, only the second could possibly be negative (note that 
d # sd>0). A condition to guarantee 5(rC&r5D  0 is ~d  2~d.  
Simulations also show that increases in the degree of heterogeneity tend to 
increase intra-industry trade in most cases7. This means that the increase in the 
heterogeneity normally leads to higher intra-industry comparative ad antage. 
Summarizing the above results, we have the following theorem: 
                                                          
7 For example, when the two countries are of similar size have their technology 
levels in sector 2 are close, intraindustry trade decreases with 3 only if ~d is 
as high as 40. 
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Theorem 2. In the two-sector Eaton and Kortum model, inter-industry 
trade and world trade volume increases with the degree of heterogeneity; 
intra-industry trade, however, may increase or decrease with it. 
 
3.6. Technological Improvements and Social Welfare 
This section studies how the changes in the technology levels of industries 
affect the welfare of trade participants in a two-sector Eaton and Kortum 
model. There has been a rich literature on the welfare effects of technology 
improvements in the Ricardian model. Hicks (1953) pointed out that although 
technology improvements benefit the innovator, their effect on the foreign 
country depends on whether the improvements are import-biased or export-
biased. Uniform and export-biased technology improvements benefit foreign 
countries, while import-biased technology improvements hurt the foreign 
country by worsening its terms of trade. Grossman and Helpman (1995), 
Samuelson (2004), Ruffin and Jones (2007) revisit the question and refine 
Hicks’ argument. 
The Ricardian model, however, does not consider firm heterogeneity and 
intra-industry trade. It remains an open question whether Hicks’ argument 
carries over to a model that incorporates these features. To fill this gap, I 
analyze the welfare effects of changes in technology levels in the two-sect r 
Eaton and Kortum model.  
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3.6.1. Welfare Effects on the Home Country 
The welfare effects of technology improvements can be decomposed into 
changes in the price indices relative to the wage rate. The price of the final 
good in sector  is td  uvd!D.d in the home country. For people in the home 
country, the price of good  divided by the wage rate is: 
td/ .d  uvd!D 
where vd  Bd  BO|d is the consumer-perceived technology level of 
sector  in the home country. The intuition is clear: when the perceived 
technology level increases, goods become cheaper relative to people’s income. 
When Bd increases, the relative wage rate of the home country increases, 
which means that |d will increase.  Consequently, it leads to an increase in vd 
and makes goods cheaper relative to the home country wage rate.  
The above results amount to saying that the home country must be better 
off after the technological improvement since the prices of both goods decrease 
relative to the wage rate in the home country. 8 
The effects on the home country can also be decomposed into a direct 
effect (
PrPq&r) and an indirect effect through the relative wage rate (PrPr 5r5q&r): 4ed4Bd  AedABd  AedA|d 4|d4Bd  3ed EBd  BO|dF  3ed a BOEBd  BO|dF  BOEBd  BO|dFb 4|d4Bd 
                                                          




Both effects are positive, so the technological improvements always benefit 
the home country. Simulations show that the marginal effect on of 
technological improvements on the home country is diminishing, with both the 
direct and the indirect effects deceasing. The following is an example of 
simulation: 
  0.5, 3  0.15; d  1; O  1; Bd  1; BO  1; BO  2; n  4  
 
Figure 3-3: The Welfare Effects on the Home Country (1) 
  0.5, 3  0.15; d  1.5; O  1; Bd  1; BO  1; BO  2; n  4  
 
Figure 3-4: The Welfare Effects on the Home Country (2) 
 




Figure 3-5: The Welfare Effects on the Home Country (3) 
Note:  In these simulations, the expenditure share of sector 1 
is 0.5; that of the other is 0.5. The degree of heterogeneity is 0.15. 
The labor endowments of two countries are both 1. The 
horizontal axis represents the home country’s technology frontier 
in sector 1. Bd, BO=4 BO are other technology frontier 
parameters of two countries. n  4 is the elasticity of 
substitution. The dotted curve represents the direct effect of the 
effect of technological improvements on the welfare of the home 
country; the dashed curve represents the indirect effect; the solid 
curve represents the total effect. 
 
3.6.2. Welfare Effects on the Foreign Country 
In the foreign country, the price of the final good in sector  divided by the 
wage rate is: 
tO/ .O  uvO!D 
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where  vO  BO  Bd/|d. For sector 1 we have vO  BO  Bd/|d. In 
Appendix 3.E, I prove that 4Bd/|d/4Bd  0. Therefore the consumer 
perceived technology of sector 1 (Bd) increases in the foreign country, leading 
to decreases in tO/ .O. For sector 2 we have vO  BO  Bd/|d. Since the 
relative wage rate of the home country increases after the technology 
improvement ( 4|d/4Bd  0), the consumer perceived technology of sector 2 
(Bd) decreases in the foreign country, leading to increases in tO/ .O. The 
overall effect of technological improvements on the foreign country depends 
on the relative magnitude of these two effects9.  
In Appendix 3.F, I show that export-biased technological improvements 
generally benefit the foreign country, which is in line with the prediction of the 
standard Ricardian model. The difference between the two models, however, is 
highlighted by the effects of import-biased technological improvements. In 
Appendix 3.F I show that the welfare effect on the foreign country could be 
negative when ~d is small enough10. The two-sector Eaton and Kortum 
model, however, also argues that an import-biased technology improvement 
                                                          
9 Given a uniform technological improvement, Bd/|dincreases as I proves in 
Appendix D. Since Bd increases, the perceived technology in the foreign 
country(vO  BO  Bd/|d.) increases. Therefore tO/ .O  uvO!Ddecreases 
in both sectors, which amounts to saying that a uniform technological 
improvement always benefits the foreign country. 
10 An example where an import-biased technological improvement deteriorates 
the foreign country can be found in Appendix I. 
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may benefit the foreign country, as shown in Appendix 3.F11. This contradicts 
the conclusion of the Ricardian model that import-biased technological 
improvements will never benefit the foreign country, as argued by Hicks 
(1958) “Whatever are the monetary arrangements, whatever the course of 
money incomes, an improvement in A-productivity that is import-biased must 
make B worse off.”  
The effects on the home country can also be decomposed into a direct 
effect (
PPq&r) and an indirect effect through the relative wage rate (PPr 5r5q&r): 
4eO4Bd  AeOABd  AeOA|d 4|d4Bd 
 3eO EBO|d  BdF # 3eO|d a BdEBO|d  BdF  BdEBO|d  BdFb 4|d4Bd 
  0.5, 3  0.15; d  1; O  1; Bd  1; BO  1; BO  2; n  4  
 
Figure 3-6: The Welfare Effects on the Foreign Country (1) 
  0.5, 3  0.15; d  1.5; O  1; Bd  1; BO  1; BO  2; n  4  
                                                          
11 An example where an import-biased technological improvement benefits the 




Figure 3-7: The Welfare Effects on the Foreign Country (2) 
  0.5, 3  0.15; d  1; O  1; Bd  1; BO  0.5; BO  2; n  4  
 
Figure 3-8: The Welfare Effects on the Foreign Country (3) 
Note:  In this simulation, the expenditure share of sector 1 is 
0.5; that of the other is 0.5. The degree of heterogeneity is 0.15. 
The labor endowments of two countries are both 1. The 
horizontal axis represents the home country’s technology frontier 
in sector 1. Bd, BO=4 BO are other technology frontier 
parameters of two countries. n  4 is the elasticity of 
substitution. The dotted curve represents the direct effect of the 
effect of technological improvements on the welfare of the foreign 
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country; the dashed curve represents the indirect effect; the solid 
curve represents the total effect. 
This discrepancy can be explained by firm heterogeneity. In the standard 
Ricardian model, import-biased technological improvements substitute home 
country goods for the foreign country goods altogether. In a two-sector Eaton 
and Kortum model, however, only inefficient foreign firms are replaced by 
efficient home country firms when the home country makes an import-biased 
technology improvement. The replacement process will inflict a negative terms
of trade effect on the foreign country, but it also creates a productivity gain 
arising from intra-industry reallocation. The productivity gain may dominate 
the terms of trade effect and result in a positive welfare effect given an import-
biased technological improvement. 
The realization of the productivity gain (increase in the consumer 
perceived productivity level) depends on heterogeneity of firms. We can say 
that it helps to spread the benefit of technology improvement. This echoes 
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) point that “the behavior of heterogenerous 
firms magnifies countries’ comparative advantage and thereby creates a new 
source of welfare gains from trade”.  
3.6.3. Remarks  
The above analysis shows that when the top tier utility function takes the 
Cobb-Douglas form, the marginal effect on the innovator are always positive 
and that on the foreign country is negative at first (strongly import-biased) 
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while positive later on (weakly import-biased or export-biased). The results are 
show in the following graph of simulation: 
  0.5, 3  0.15; d  1; O  1; Bd  1; BO  1; BO  2; n  4  
 
Figure 3-9: The Welfare Effects Given Cobb-Douglas Utility Functio  
As mentioned in the literature, countries may encounter immiserizing 
growth when improving their technology. The setup in this paper, however, 
does not yield this phenomenon. A possible reason is that Cobb-Douglas utility 
function does not give us a demand function that is sufficiently inelastic. To 
check if this is the reason and also to complete the analysis, I assume that two 
final goods are complements: 
ef, f  f  f/,   0 
We can prove that the above utility function converges to a Cobb-Douglas 
function when  approaches zero and when it tends to infinity it becomes a 




Simulations show that when Bd is positive, the new utility function 
generates the same patterns as those generated by the Cobb-Douglas function.
The following is a typical graph. 
  #1, 3  0.15; d  1; O  1; Bd  1; BO  1; BO  2; n  4  
 
Figure 3-10: The Welfare Effects When Goods Are Complements (1) 
However, when Bd is very close to zero technological improvements may 
hurt the innovator, as shown in the following example: 
  #1, 3  0.15; d  1; O  0; Bd  1; BO  1; BO  2; n  4  
 
Figure 3-11: The Welfare Effects When Goods Are Complements (2) 
The effects on the foreign country are always positive, which is consistent 
with the fact that all technological improvements are export-biased for the 
70 
 
home country. The effects on the foreign country, however, could eventually 
turn into negative. Simulations show the following pattern: 
• A smaller BO makes the negative effects come sooner. 
• A smallerBO or BO makes the negative effects come sooner. 
• A larger home country or a smaller foreign country makes the negative 
effects come sooner. 
When Bd increases, inelastic demand will cause the return to sector 1 
producers to decrease. A small Bd, however, implies that very little 
endowment can be reallocated to sector 2. Therefore, the intense competition 
cannot be relieved through inter-industry reallocation and the innovator is hurt. 
Simulations show that existence and the timing of immiserizing growth is very 
sensitive to the magnitude of Bd, i.e., the ability that the country reallocation 
its endowments. Therefore, I propose that factor immobility may be one of the 
conditions that are necessary for immiserizing growth. 
3.7. Empirical Analysis of Comparative Advantage and Net Exports 
According to section 3.4.1, the net exports of sector  (d) increase with 
the advantage of sector  (~d) and decrease with the advantage of the other 
sector. This implies that d is positively correlated the ratio of ~d to ~d 
(~d/~d, stu@d thereafter) or the difference between them (~d # ~d, stu4d thereafter), which can be taken as measures of the strength of 
comparative advantage. This section investigates whether the positive 
correlation between net exports and comparative advantage exists in data.  
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3.7.1. Econometric Model 
The theoretical model shows that the absolute value of net exports of a 
country increases with the country size12. To control for the effect of country 
size, the net exports of a sector are divided by the country’s GDP to construct 
the dependent variable (d  6rr). Theoretically, d is positively 
correlated with stu@ or stu4. For tractability, the model in 
this paper assumes there are no trade barriers. However, they do exist in the 
real world and exercise substantial effects on trade volumes. Let  denote the 
trade barriers, then we have the following econometric model: 
d  "m  "stud  "  ;=stu4d   ;=stu4d  o)d  d 
 
In the above model, o)d denotes the country, time and industry group 
dummies. The tariff is multiplied by the sign of stu4d because when 
the country has comparative advantage in sector , he net exports decreases 
with trade barriers while decreases with trade barriers when sector  is the 
comparatively disadvantage sector. For the same reason, the dummies are 
multiplied by the sign of stu4d.  
The model assumes balanced trade. In the real world, however, a country’s 
trade balances only rarely. To mitigate the noise stemming from trade 
                                                          
12 A caveat is that in the real world the size of net exports also depends on the 
size of the domestic market and the type of economy.  
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imbalance, I calculate the imbalance-adjusted trade volume of each sector and 
construct dependent variables based on them. I first calculate the total trade 
surplus. Then I calculate the trade volume share of each sector. Finally, I 
multiply the total trade surplus by the trade volume share of a sector and 
subtract it from the net exports of that sect.  The imbalance-adjusted net 
exports is denoted as . Accordingly, we have the following econometric 
model: 
d  "m  "stud  "  ;=stu4d   ;=stu4d  o)d  d 
where d  d/td. 
When stud increases, d should increase and d should 
decrease. That means d # d should increase with stud. 
Define d  d # d and d  d/td and have the 
follow econometric model. 
d  "m  "stud  "  ;=stu4d   ;=stu4d  o)d  d 
Likewise, we have the imbalance-adjusted version of the above model: 
d  "m  "stud  "  ;=stu4d   ;=stu4d  o)d  d 
For all above econometric models, the theoretical model predicts that the 
coefficient of stud should be positive. 
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3.7.2.  Data and Measurements 
I use OECD STAN (STructural ANalysis) databases for this inquiry since 
they provide the needed information on the industry level with a relatively 
large number of observations. In this paper, I use STAN Industry Analysis (ed. 
2008) to calculate the productivity of each sector. I use the bilateral trade 
databases STAN BTD 2000 and STAN BTD 2008 to calculate the net exports 
of each sector. STAN BTD 2000 covers years 1980-2000 and STAN BTD 
2008 covers years 1988-2007. Since STAN BTD 2008 corrected some errors 
in previous editions, use all its information. STAN BTD 2000 is only used for 
years prior 1988. 
This study focuses on the manufacture industry. I divide the manufacture 
industry into the high-tech group and the low-tech group following the 
definition of STAN database13 . To measure the technology frontier of each 
industry group, I take each two-digit sector as a variety in the EK model. The 
observed productivity (t d) of sector  in industry group  in 
country ¡ equals the value added (ud) of sector  divided by the total 
employment of the sector ()std).  
t d  ud)std 
                                                          
13
  STAN BTD 2008 breaks the manufacturing sectors into four groups: high-tech 
manufactures   (ISIC 3: 2423+30+32+33+353 ), medium-high tech manufactures  
(ISIC 3.0: 24x+29+31+34+352+359 ), medium-low tech manufactures  (ISIC 3: 
23+25+26+27+28+351 ) and low-tech manufactures (ISIC 3: 15-16+17-19+20+21-
22+36-37). STAN BTD 2000 is in ISIC 2.0. We categorize the industries following 
the conversion table between two versions of ISIC code systems. Then we divide the 
four groups into two broad groups: high-tech group and low tech group. 
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For simplicity, the time period subscriptions are suppressed here. 
According the EK model, t d  !D , so d 
Et dF!/D. We know that d~exp Bd, so )d  1/Bd, 
where B denotes the technology frontier of industry group  in a country. A 
natural estimator of the technology frontier of industry  (¥}¦4d) is: 
¥}¦4d  §̈!   1d ©Et dF!/D
6r
ª«   ¬
!
 
where d is the number of industries in group . Due to missing data, the 
number of industries in an industry group may be different from country to 
country. 
According to the EK model, the technology frontiers of different countries 
are additive. That is, the combined technology frontier of a group of countries 
is the sum of their technology frontier weighted by wage and trade barriers. In 
this essay the world is divided into the home country(¡) and the rest of the 
world, so the technology frontier of the rest of the world (­}¦4d) 
should be measured as the sum of the weighted technology frontier for all other 
countries.  However, only the information for the OECD countries is available 
and it is not easy to get complete information on wages and pair-wise trade 
barriers.  As an alternative, I measure the technology frontier as the sum of the 
(un-weighted) technology frontier of all OECD countries except the country 
taken as the home country. This does not follow the theoretical setup closely, 
but it is still a reasonable measure. First, the OECD countries include majority 
of the most productive countries. The technology frontier calculated based on 
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them should be a good measure of the world technology frontier. Second, 
OECD countries bear substantial resemblance and their mutual tariffs are low 
and close, so the variation of the weight on their technology frontier should not 
be large. Therefore the technology frontier of the rest of the world is 
approximated by ­}¦4d  ∑ ¥}¦4¯¯°d .  
The comparative advantage measures are defined as mentioned in the 
previous section, where: 
stu@d  ¥}¦4d­}¦4d ¥}¦4d­}¦4d±  stu@d  log stu@d 
and 
stu4d  ¥}¦4d­}¦4d # ¥}¦4d­}¦4d 
The final dataset set contains 26 countries for years 1980-200614. All the 
trade volumes are in 2006 PPP dollars. 
3.7.3. Empirical Results 
3.7.3.1. Regressions 
Table 3-1 reports the OLS results when the percentage share of the net 
exports of each sector in GDP () is the dependent variable. The results 
are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. The estimated 
coefficients of all comparative advantage measures are positive and most of 
                                                          
14 A problem of using this sample is that for the majority of countries the trade 
is not balanced. In a subsequent section, I tried to adjust the variables of the 
econometric model for trade imbalance in a bid to mitigate this problem. 
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them are significant. I use the simple world average tariff to measure trade 
barriers (World Bank). For all specifications, the estimated coefficients of T 
are negative. The results also show that regressions with imbalance-adjusted 
measures yield higher R-square and higher significance level for T.  
Table 3-1: Results of Regressions (Dependent Variable: µ¶·) 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Imbalance-Adjusted  
COMPADVr            0.00032   0.00004   
                     2.177**   0.507   
COMPADVrl  0.00263   0.00287  
                      1.962*   3.994***  
COMPADVd   0.01339   0.01468 
                       0.988   2.011** 
T                -0.00009 -0.00039 -0.00047 -0.00056 -0.00068 -0.00076 
                     -0.087 -0.387 -0.459 -0.995 -1.248 -1.387 
N                    1024 1060 1060 1024 1060 1060 
R2  0.17259 0.16591 0.16355 0.37489 0.38166 0.37443 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
Table 3-2 reports the OLS results when  and  are the 
dependent variable. The results are similar for comparative advantage 







Table 3-2: Results of Regressions (Dependent Variable: µ¶¸·) 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Imbalance-Adjusted  
COMPADVr            0.00068   0.00058   
                     2.210**   2.267**   
COMPADVrl  0.00445   0.00461  
                      1.957*   2.462**  
COMPADVd   0.03052   0.03461 
                       1.329   1.831* 
T                0.00078 0.00005 -0.00006 0.00034 -0.00018 -0.0003 
                     0.443 0.029 -0.035 0.234 -0.127 -0.21 
N                    512 530 530 512 530 530 
R2  0.33629 0.33235 0.32952 0.37111 0.37102 0.36753 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
3.7.3.2. Sign Tests 
Another approach to examine the prediction concerning the net exports is 
to conduct sign tests. The model predicts that the net exports of a sector should 
be positive if the country has comparative advantage in that sector. We can test 
the null that that the sign of the net exports is completely random (i.e., 
td  stu4d  0  0.5) against the alternative that it is not 
(i.e., td  stu4d  0  0.5).  
The dataset contains 1122 valid (d, stu4d) pairs. d stu4d is negative for 488 pairs and positive for the other 634 pairs. 
The p-value of the sign test is 0.000006, so the null is rejected. 
I then consider the imbalance-adjusted net exports.  For the 1122 
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(d, stu4d) pairs. d  stu4d is negative for 450 
pairs and positive for the other 672 pairs. The p-value of the sign test is very 
close to zero, so the null is again rejected. 
Therefore, the sign tests provide further support for the prediction 
concerning net exports. 
3.8. Conclusion 
Recent trade literature has begun to model firm level heterogeneity since it 
is large and persistent in the data. Few papers, however, have combined it with 
comparative advantage. This paper tries to fill this gap by studying how 
heterogeneity and comparative advantage work in a perfect-competition model. 
Based on a two-sector Eaton and Kortum model, this paper shows that 
technology improvements always increase the total trade. They increase inter-
industry trade if they originate in the comparative advantage sector, otherwise 
they decreases inter-industry trade. Increases in the degree of heter geneity 
always increase the total trade and inter-industry trade. 
The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of technology improvements 
and yields some new results. It shows that with the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function technology improvements are always beneficial to the innovator. In 
agreement to the literature, export-biased improvements benefit the foreign 
country.  In a departure from the literature, however, the paper shows that 
import-biased improvements could benefit the foreign country. The paper also 




The theoretical model of the paper shows that the net exports of the 
comparative advantage sector are positive while those of the other sector are 
negative. Using the OECD STAN databases, the paper conducts a simple test 
concerning the prediction and finds strong support for it. 
Although the model provides a framework to explain the effects of 
technology changes in the open economy, a caveat should be borne in mind 
that it does not incorporate some important mechanisms. The perfect 
competition assumption in the model precludes the analysis of trade facts that 
arise from imperfect competition. Differences in the endowments across 
countries, which is assumed away in this work, can play an important role in 
the determining the effects of technological changes.  
The model does not consider dynamics of international trade, which has 
become increasingly important in economic studies (e.g., Matsuyama, 1991; 
Ventura, 1997, 2005; Galor and Mountford, 2006).  A dynamic extension of 
this model to further study the endogenous technological change may be 
fruitful. 
3.9. Appendices 
3.9.1. Appendix 3.A: Definitions of Variables 
Note: Through out this essay subscripts are either country or industry 




Table 3-3: Definitions of Variables 
Definition Description 
d, O Labor endowments of the home country and the foreign country 
 g 0,1 Expenditure share on sector 1   1 #  Expenditure share on sector 2 
.d, .O Wage rates of the home country and the foreign country 
Bd, BO Technology frontiers of sector i of the home country and the foreign country 
 Variety identifier 
d, O 
Random draws of the productivity index for 
variety u in sector i for the home country and 
the foreign country 
3 Degree of productivity heterogeneity 
n Elasticity of substitution between varieties 
, º  1,2 Sector indices 
k Quantity of variety u of sector i f Xw k!/l4m Yl/l!  The quantity of sector i final good {d  .d/.O  The relative wage of the home country 
|d  .d/D/.O/D A function of the home country relative wage 
vd  Bd  BO|d The consumer perceived technology level of sector i in the home country 
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vO  BO  Bd/|d The consumer perceived technology level of sector i in the foreign country 
u  »1  31 # n A constant 
td  uvd!D.d The price index of sector i final good in the home country 
tO  uvO!D.O The price index of sector i final good in the foreign country 
}d  q6r¼6r   
The import share of sector i intermediate goods 
of the home country 
}O  q6r/r¼6   
The import share of sector i intermediate goods 
of the foreign country 
sd  6r&'r16rCr   
The total imports of sector i intermediate goods 
of the home country 
d  O~d.O|d  ~d  
The total exports of sector i intermediate goods 
of the home country 
sd X &&rCr  ((rCrY |dDCd.O  The total imports of the home country d  X &&rrC&r  ((rrC(rY O.O  The total exports of the home country 
~d  Bd/BO The ration of the home country technology level of sector i to that of the foreign country 
d  .O G 6r'rC6r #r&'r6rCrY  
The net export of sector i of the home country 
r6r  The elasticity of φ¾ with respect to ρ¾ 
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Φ A positive number, whose value is different in different expressions 
 
3.9.2. Appendix 3.B: The Price Indices of the Final Goods 
Consider sector i, let   Ed, OF denote the draws productivity for 
intermediate goods in two countries. Assume that these draws are independent 
across countries, so the joint density of x is: 
À  ÀdÀO  BdBO expE#Bdd # BOOF 
Let  follow the above distribution, then the quantity of the final good is: 
f  aj Àk!/l4Á(  b
l/l!
 
We put all the intermediate goods with productivity  into to the same 
group. Following Alvarez and Lucas, we label the group of goods with the 
associated productivity and call them “good ”. 
Consider the home country. The price of final goods in each sector is: 
td  aj d!lÁ( À4b
/!l
 
The demand function of intermediate good x in the home country is: 
kd  d!ltlfd 
If the home country producers of the final goods buy intermediate goods 
from domestic firms, the price is .ddD  ; if they buy from foreign firms, the 
83 
 
price is .OOD  . The buyers will choose the lowest price among .ddD   and 
.OOD  . The price that prevail in the home country is: 
d  minÂ.ddD  , .OOD  Ã  d/D  minÄ.d/Dd, .O/DOÅ 
where d~ expBd , O~ expEBOF. A nice property of the 
exponential distribution is that (Alvarez and Lucas, 2007):  
~ expB =4 Æ  0  Æ~exp B/Æ 
Consequently we have: 
.d/Dd~ expXBd/.d/DY 
Another property of the exponential distribution is that (Alvarez and Lucas, 
2007): 
~ expB , ~ expB , W?Ç,   0, È  min,   È~B  B 
Therefore d/D has the following distribution: 
d/D~ exp GXBd  BO.d/D/.O/D Y/.d/DH 
Let vd  Bd  BO.d/D/.É/D , then we have: 
Ê/D~ expXvÊ/.Ê/DY 
 vd is the “consumer-perceived” sector  technology level in  the home 
country. For ease in writing, define {d  .d/.O,  |d  .d/D/.O/D. Through 
out this paper, the wage rate in the foreign country is taken as the numéraire. 
Then we have: 
vd  Bd  BO|d 
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Consider  w d!lÁ( À4. Since À is the probability distribution 
function of x, so the integral can be taken as the expectation of  d!l in the 
technology spaceC . d!l  with ~À in C  corresponds to d!l 
d/DD!l  ÇD!l with Ç~ expXvd/.d/DY in C . Here Ç is the projection 
of d/D on C . Therefore, the expectation of  d!l in the technology space 
is equivalent to the expectation of  ÇD!l in C . This implies that 
td  aj ÇD!lvd/.d/Dp!Ë¼6r/1r&/4Çzm b
/!l
 
Let x  Çvd/.d/D, we have that: 
td  Xvd/.d/DY!D  aj xD!lp!y4xzm b
/!l
 
Let u  Ew xD!lp!y4xzm F/!l, which is value of the Gamma function ΓÍ at Í  1  31 # n raised to 1/1 # n power. Following Alvarez and 
Lucas (2007), I assume 1  31 # n  0 so as to guarantee the integral 
converges. Henceforth, I will take A as a constant. So we have: 
td  uvd!D.d 
Likewise, the price of good  in the foreign country is: 
tO  uvO!D.O 
3.9.3. Appendix 3.C: Imports and Exports 




sd  }dtdfd  }d j dÁ( k À4  j d+6 k À4 
where $O denotes the set on which the foreign country offers the lowest 
price (transportation costs inclusive)  for goods x of sector i in the home 
country. Alvarez and Lucas argue that }d is equal to PrE g $OF where 
~À is the vector of productivity in two countries (Alvarez and Lucas). 
Therefore, we have: 
}d  PrE g $OF  Pr GX.O/DYO  minÄ.d/Dd, .O/DOÅH  
 
We know that  
.d/Dd~ expXBd/.d/DY 
and the property of the exponential distribution: 
~ expB , ~ expB , W?Ç,   0  Pr *   BB  B 
Therefore, we have: 
}d  BO|dvd  
Likewise, the share of the sector i intermediate goods that the foreign 
imports from the home country is: 
}O  Bd/|dvO  
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3.9.4. Appendix 3.D: Total Trade and Technological Levels 
The total trade is: 
d  G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH O.O 
To study the effect of technological levels of the home country on total 
trade, we just need to assume the technology levels of the foreign country do 
not change calculate 
5r5&r.  4d4~d  Φ G |d|d  ~d # G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH 4|d4~dH 
Note that the equilibrium is defined by: 
d  G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH O.O # G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH |dDCd.O 0 
Employing the implicit function theorem, we have: 
4|d43  # Ad/A3Ad/A|d  X
~d  |d  ~d  |dY d|dDC.O=|Ad/A|d  
 
where Ad/A|d is: 
Ad/A|d  Ð ~d|d  ~d  ~dE|d  ~dF O
# Ð ~d  |d  E~d  |dF d|dDC 3  1 a ~d  |d  ~d  |db d|dD 
Plug them into 
5r5&r . After tedious calculation, we have: 4d4~d  Φ3 d|dD~d  |d  3 d|dD~d  |d 
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3.9.5. Appendix 3.E: The Growth Rate of the Relative-Wage 
In this section, I show how fast the relative wage growth relative to the 
technology level. Since the productivity draws are raised to the 3
power( d!D ), we should compare |d  {/D with Bd, the technology 
index that increases.   
Consider a uniform technological improvement in the home country. Let 
~d/  (  1,2) denote the new value of ~d and suppose  6r06r  Λ  1. Let |d/  the 
value of |d after the technology improvement. Suppose |d increases at a rate 
that is at least equal to the technology improvement, i.e.,   
r0r - Λ. Consider 
the equilibrium condition: 
O G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH  G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH d|dDC 
Then LHS of the equilibrium condition after the technology improvement 
is: 
O a ~d/|d/  ~d/  ~d/|d/  ~d/ b * O G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH 
The RHS of the equilibrium condition after the technology improvement is 
a |d/~dÒ  |dÒ  |dÒ~dÒ  |dÒb d|d/ DC - G |d~d  |d  |d~d  |dH d|dDΛÓC 
We can see that the RHS is greater than the LHS after the technology 
improvement. This contradicts the trade balance condition. Therefore we must 
have 
r0r  Ô given a uniform technological improvement.  
88 
 
Since the relative wage rate increases less given a biased technology 
improvement (
6r06r  Λ, Õr0Õr  1),  the relative wage rate must grow even slower. 
Therefore we must have 4~d/|d/4~d  0, (or 4Bd/|d/4Bd  0) 
given a biased technological improvement.  
3.9.6. Appendix 3.F: Welfare Effects on the Foreign Country 
The welfare of the foreign country is: 
eO·  6Õ  Ou!EEBO  Bd/|dF6EBO  Bd/|dFÕFD 
Consider a monotonic transformation of it: 
O  =EBO  Bd/|dF  =EBO  Bd/|dF 
Then we have: 
4O4Bd  1BO|d G |d|d  ~d # G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH 4|d4~dH 
where  4|d4~d
 O|d  d|d
DC|d  ~d
G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH O # G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH d|dDC3  1 X ~d  |d  ~d  |dY d|dD 
 
and  |d is determined by the equilibrium condition: 
d  0 
• The Welfare Effects of Export-biased Improvements 
Consider the case where ~d  ~d. 
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4O4Bd  1BO|d G |d|d  ~d # G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH 4|d4~dH  1BO|d G |d|d  ~d # G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH 4|d4~dH  1BO|d|d  ~d E # r&rF 
When ~d  ~d, we have r&r  . Since |d is bounded, generally 
speaking the wage rate increasing at a slower rate than ~d, which means that 
r&r   when ~d  ~d. This implies that  5ª5q&r  0, which means that 
technological improvement s increases the welfare of the foreign country. 
• Import-biased Improvements That Hurts the Foreign Country 
Consider the case where ~d  ~d. 
4O4Bd  1BO|d G |d|d  ~d # G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH 4|d4~dH  1BO|d G |d|d  ~d # G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH 4|d4~dH  ΦE # r&rF 
When ~d is very small, the wage rate are sensitive to changes in ~d, so 
r&r could be larger than  and leads to a negative effects on the foreign 
welfare. 
Let us consider an example in which an import-biased technology 
improvement has negative effects on the foreign country. Suppose ~d 1/~d  1, d  O ,   1. In this case, we must have |d  1. Consequently: 




5r56r  66rCDE6CÕ6rFC6r, we have: 
4O4Bd  Φ2~d  3  ~d1  ~d # 2 
If 3 is small enough we can see that 5ª5q&r  0 .  
• Import-biased Improvements That Benefits the Foreign Country 
Suppose ~d  ~d, we have: 
4O4Bd  1BO|d  ~d E # r&rF 
I proved above that r&r   when ~d  ~d(refer to the section on 
changes in total trade volume.), therefore 
5ª5q&r  0. 
Given the setup in this paper, 
5ª5&r is a continuous function. Therefore we 
have 
5ª5&r  0 when ~d is in the left vicinity of ~d. In other words, we are 
sure that import-biased technological improvements increases the welfare of 
the foreign country when it is about to eliminate the comparative advantage. 
Consider the symmetric example in “Import-biased Improvements That 
Hurts the Foreign Country”. If 3 is large enough we must have 5ª5q&r  0 . This 
is an example in which export biased technological improvements benefits the 
foreign country. 
3.9.7. Appendix 3.G: Equilibrium When Two Final Goods Are 
Complements 
Suppose that the two final goods are compliments 
ef, f  f  f/,   0 
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Given income w and price t and t we have: 
fd  .td  td!td! 
We know that  td  uvd!D.d 
and the import share of the home country in sector : 
}d  BO|dvd  
Therefore the imports of sector  are: 
sd  }dtdfd  BO|dvd d.d1  GvdvdH
D!  
The total import of the home country is: 
sd  sd  sd
 |dd.d Ö BOBd  BO|d 1  aBd  BO|dBd  BO|db
D!¬!
 BOBd  BO|d 1  aBd  BO|dBd  BO|db
D! ¬!¬ 
Likewise, the import of the foreign country is: 
sO  O.O Ö BdBO|d  Bd 1  aBO|d  BdBO|d  Bdb
D!¬!
 BdBO|d  Bd 1  aBO|d  BdBO|d  Bdb
D! ¬!¬ 
Therefore the trade balance condition is: 
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|dDCd Ö BOBd  BO|d 1  aBd  BO|dBd  BO|db
D!¬!
 BOBd  BO|d 1  aBd  BO|dBd  BO|db
D! ¬!¬
 O Ö BdBO|d  Bd 1  aBO|d  BdBO|d  Bdb
D!¬!
 BdBO|d  Bd 1  aBO|d  BdBO|d  Bdb
D! ¬!¬ 
Given the equilibrium |d, the utility of the home country is: ef, f  f  f/ 
 
 du aaEBd  BO|dF!D  EBd  BO|dF D!EBd  BO|dF D!b!
 aEBd  BO|dF!D
 EBd  BO|dF D!EBd  BO|dF D!Y!b/ 
Likewise, we have: 
eO  Ou aaEBO  Bd/|dF!D  EBO  Bd/|dF D!EBO  Bd/|dF D!b!
 aEBO  Bd/|dF!D




Chapter 4 :  
HICKS PATH: THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGICAL 




In his paper on technological improvements, Hicks (1953) argued that “the 
first stage in a process of development is very likely to be export-biased,” nd 
then “… the process passes into its second stage … that are import-biased.”  
Thus when his analysis “is put into an historical dress, it suggests as a normal 
sequence the succession of an export-biased by an import-biased phase”
(Hicks 1953), a pattern that I refer to as Hicks path hereafter.  
Interesting as it is, there have been no theoretical explanations for the 
pattern. Hicks argued that “countries, like people, are most likely to make their 
improvements in those sorts of production which they already do relatively 
well than in those they do relatively badly.” However, he did not use a model 
to formally prove the argument, nor did he explain the reason behind it. As for 
the empirical evidence, Hicks listed some historical facts and argue that “we 
see the shadows of such patterns across the face of history”. Neither he nor 
other economists have conducted formal empirical tests on Hicks path. To fill 
this gap, this work provides a theoretical foundation for Hicks path in this 
paper and investigates if it exists in the data. 
In order to study the technological improvement pattern, the first step is to 
model innovation activities. Kortum (1997) develops a R&D framework that 
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proves to be realistic. In his model, each unit of R&D input generates a random 
amount of new ideas whose productivity is a random draw from a Pareto 
distribution. Each new idea is applied to a random variety in a continuum of 
goods. The productivity associated with each good converges to a Fréchet 
distribution in limit. This model explains some puzzling trends in productivity, 
patents, and R&D activity in the United States. Kortum’s model has been 
extended to conduct other empirical analysis as well (e.g., Eaton and Kortum, 
1999).  
Eaton and Kortum (2001b) develop a unified framework of innovation, 
trade, and growth by combining Kortum (1997) and Dornbush et al. (1977). In 
their 2002 paper (Eaton and Kortum 2002), they develop a similar model of 
bilateral trade to study trade and price data among the OECD. Bernard et al. 
(2003) augment the model to study the export behavior of individual US 
plants. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) develop an equilibrium analysis to the Eaton 
and Kortum model to analyze the gains from trade liberalization.   
 This essay extends the Eaton and Kortum framework into a multi-sector 
model to analyze the innovation pattern of countries in the open economy. The 
theoretical model first analyzes the R&D pattern in autarky and shows that 
sectoral R&D input is proportional to the expenditure share and the research 
efficiency of each sector. The model also shows that the laissez faire R&D 
input level is less than the socially optimal R&D input level in autarky.  
The above results carry over to the open economy. Moreover, the model 
shows that in the open economy the total R&D input in a sector of a country 
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depend on the country’s advantage. The research efficiency function, which is 
a function of current technology frontiers of the home and the foreign 
countries, determines whether the R&D input increases of decreases with a 
country’s advantage in a sector. 
Using the OECD STAN database, the empirical analysis finds some 
support for Hicks’ path but it also indicates that the R&D pattern in the real 
world might be richer than what Hicks predicted. Within each industry, for the 
majority of countries (whose technology frontier ranks in the top 70%-80% in 
the industry) the sectoral R&D input of a country first increases with its 
technological advantage in the industry. When the country moves into the 
leading group (i.e., its technology frontier ranks among the top 20%-30% in 
the industry) its sector R&D begins to decrease with its technological 
advantage. This is consistent with Hicks’ claim that countries will first conduct 
export-biased technology improvements and then import-biased improvement. 
The empirical study, however, also finds that for the countries whose 
technological advantage ranks in bottom 20%-30% the sectoral R&D input 
decreases with their technological advantage. This might arise from the reason 
that less-developed countries may find it more profitable to rely on technology 
transfer than on research and development, a hypothesis left for future study. 15  
                                                          
15
 Both the theoretical and empirical results are based on the assumption 
that governments do not intervene the R&D of the business sector. However, 
in the real world, governments may subsidize business R&D for various 





4.2. Setup  
There are two countries: the home country (h) and the foreign country (f), 
whose labor endowments are dand O respectively.  The economies produce 
 final goods. Consumers in two countries have the same preferences over the 
final goods, and their utility function takes the Cobb-Douglas form: 
e·  × Gf H6

«  
where fis the quantity of the final good of sector   and  is the 
expenditure share of good  with  g 0,1 and ∑ «  1. Throughout this 
paper, subscripts are either country identifiers or industry identifiers and 
superscripts are exponents.  
Each type of final good is produced with a different group of intermediate 
goods. Each group of intermediate goods is indexed from 0 to 1. Firms in both 
countries can produce final goods with the same technology: 
f  aj k!/l4m b
l/l!
 
where n is the elasticity of substitution, which is the same for all sectors. 
The intermediate goods are produced with constant-returns-to-scale te hnology, 
the evolution of whose frontier will be described below. 
I follow Eaton and Kortum’s way of modeling research activities.  A unit 
of labor input on R&D generates ideas at a Poisson rate @d· which indicates 
research efficiency of sector i in the home country. The research efficiency is a 
function of the home country technology frontier ( @d·  @dBd). In the 
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open economy, the research efficiency is a function of the technology frontiers 
in home and foreign countries ( @d·  @dBd, BO). Suppose there is a 
fundamental difference between the R&D activities in autarky and in the open 
economy, so cannot set λÙ in @dBd, BO to zero to get the autarky research 
efficiency function. 
The intermediate good to which a sector i idea applies has a uniform 
distribution over the variety continuum [0, 1]. The efficiency of an idea (z) is 
defined as the quantity of goods that the idea can produce with a unit of labor. 
Following Eaton and Kortum, I assume z has a Pareto distribution Ú  1 #
Ú!/D, Ú g 1, ∞16. With this setup, the distribution of the productivity of a 
sector will converge to a Fréchet distribution over time (Kortum 1997): 
¥dÚ  p!q6rÜÝ&/ , Ú  0 
where parameter Bd is the total stock of ideas: 
Bd  j @d4dÇ4Çm  
and 4d is the flow of R&D input.  
Suppose that R&D can only be done at the beginning of each period. The 
R&D process does not take time, therefore the inventors can utilize the new 
ideas in the same period they are discovered. Suppose that firms are engaged in 
Bertrand competition, so the firm with the best idea sets its price equal to the 
marginal cost of the runner-up. The patent length is normalized to one period, 
which implies that firms’ planning horizon for R&D is one period.  
                                                          
16 Through out this paper, we define θ a la Alvarez and Lucas (2007). So a 
larger θ means a higher degree of heterogeneity. 
98 
 
The intermediate goods are traded freely while the final good is not 
tradable. The labor is immobile across countries, but perfectly mobile within a 
country and across industries. 
4.3. R&D Decisions in Autarky 
This section analyzes the technological improvements of the home country 
in autarky. Suppose that at the beginning of a period the home country 
technology frontiers are hBd, Bd, … Bdi . The population, however, becomes d/ . Suppose that that with the new population it is profitable to do research in 
both sectors. Suppose 4d units of labor is allocated to do research in sector . 
According to Eaton and Kortum’s framework, after the innovation the 
technology level of sector  becomes:  
Bd/  Bd  @dBd4d 
where Bd/  denotes the  level of technology after the innovation . In what 
follows, primes are used to indicate the variables after the innovation.  
4.3.1. The Decentralized R&D Decision in Autarky 
4.3.1.1. The Expected Value of an Idea 
This section calculates the expected value of an idea in autarky. In 
Appendix 4.A, I show that under perfect competition when all firms have 
access to the best technology the price of intermediate goods of sector  has the 
following distribution d/D~ expXvd/.d/DY, where vd  Bd  BO|d is the 
consumer-perceived technology level in the home country. In autarky, the 
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foreign goods does not reach the home country so vd  Bd. After the 
innovation, given perfect competition we have  
d/ /D~ exp Xvd/ /.d/ /DY 
We can take this as the distribution of the cost after technology 
improvement. Let us consider a marginal researcher. If her idea associated wtih 
variety  is competitive in the home country, one must have: 
.d/ /Ú  d/   Ú  .d/ /d/  
When this is the case, the optimal price could be the monopolistic price or 
the second lowest cost in the market. Bernard et al. (2003) consider both 
possibilities. However, the true distribution of the markup is complicated. 
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Eaton 
and Kortum (2001b, 2006), I assume that a successful researcher always sets 
the price to d/ . Appendix 4.A shows that the price index of the final good 
in sector  is td  uvd!D.d, so the demand of variety  is: 
kd/   d/ !lul!vd/ D!ld/ .d/ l 
The profit that a successful idea earns in the home country is: 
ßddÚ,   d/  # .d/ /Ú d/ !lul!vd/ D!ld/ .d/ l 
Appendix 4.B shows that the expectation of ßddÚ,  is: 
)EßddÚ, F  3E1  31 # nF1  3vd/ d/ .d/  
4.3.2. Equilibrium R&D Input 
In equilibrium, the return to labor input in production and that to R&D 
should be equalized: 
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@dBd)EßddÚ, F  .d/  
Solving this equation, we have: 
Bd/  1  31 # n1  3 3@dBdd/  
The R&D input is: 
4d  1  31 # n1  3 3@dBdd/ # Bd/@dBd 
Suppose that the new population is sufficiently large so that the R&D input 
is non-negative.The ratio of the two post-innovation technology levels is: 
Bd/Bd/  @dBd@dBd 
The research intensity of the country is: 
∑ 4d«d/  1  31 # n1  3 © 3@dBd

« # 1d/ © Bd@dBd

«  
which is increasing in d. This means that the research intensity increases with 
the country size. 
When d/   goes to infinity, the research intensity ∑ 56rà6á&'r0  tends to a constant 
CD!lCD ∑ 3@dBd«  since that Bd is exogenous to d/ . Eaton and 
Kortum(2001b) consider a steady state in which a constant share of the labor 
force in a country engages in research.  The model in this essay is extended to 
a dynamic version, this type of steady state will be the only possible steady 
state since Bd/  is proportional to d/ . 
101 
 
4.3.3.  The Social Planner’s R&D Decision in Autarky 
Now let us assume that a social planner chooses R&D input to maximize 
social welfare. Suppose the R&D input in a sector is 4d, then after the 
technological improvement the new welfare level is: 
ed/ ·   u! Ðd/ # © 4d«  ×  Bd/ D6

«  
The solution to the above maximization problem is defined by  first order 
conditions: 
© 4d«  4d3  d/ # Bd3@d ,  g 1, 2, …  
Let 4 denote the R&D input vector h4d, 4d, … 4diâ, where  is the 
transpose operator. 
Let D denote coefficient matrix for the unknowns: 
 
ãää
äå1 # 1/3 1 1 … 11 1 # 1/3 1 … 11 1 1 # 1/æ3 … 1… … … … …1 1 1 … 1 # 1/3çè
èèé 
Let column vector R denote the vector that contains the right hand side of 
the first order conditions: 
  Id/ # Bd3@dBd d/ # Bd3@dBd … d/ # Bd3@dBdJâ 
 Then the FOC’s can be written as: 
 · 4   
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Let  denote the matrix when we replace the d column of  with . 
According to Cramer’s rule, we have: 
4d  ||||  
where|| and || are the determinants of  and . Suppose that the 
country is large enough so that the social planner wants to improve the 
technology in both sectors.  
When there are only two sectors, we have: 
4d  3@dBdEBd  @dEBdFd/ F # @dEBdFBdE1  3F3  1@dBd@dEBdF ,    1,2; º  1,2;  ë º 
The above result tells us that the R&D input in each sector increases with 
the research efficiency, consumer’s expenditure share on the sector and the 
country size. It can also be shown that the overall research intensity of a 
country increases with the country size.  
Since the post-innovation technology level of sector  is Bd/ 
D6CD XE@dBdBdF/@dBd  @dBdd/  BdY, the ratio of the two post-
innovation technology levels is: 
Bd/Bd/  @dBd@dBd 
Denote the social planner post-innovation technology of sector  level with 
Bd%/  D6CD XE@dBdBdF/@dBd  @dBdd/  BdY,  the decentralized one 
with Bd5/  CD!lCD 3@dBdd/   Then we have: 
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Bd%/Bd5/  11  31 # n 
Since n  1, 1  31 # n  1 . Therefore we have: 
11  31 # n  1  Bd%/  Bd5/  
This means that the social optimal post-innovation technology level is 
higher than the one in laissez faire. In laissez faire, researchers set the ou put 
level lower than the social optimal level since they can’t capture all the profit 
of new ideas. This leads to lower R&D input and social welfare in the 
decentralized case.  
Summarizing the above results, we have the following theorem: 
Theorem 1: No matter whether the R&D decisions are made by a 
social planner or individuals, in autarky the post-innovation technology of 
each sector is proportional to its expenditure share and research 
efficiency. The socially optimal R&D input is greater than the one in 
laissez faire for both sectors when there are only two sectors.  
4.4. R&D Decisions in the open economy 
This section studies the R&D patterns in the open economy. Suppose only 
the home country does research. Its initial population is d and the new one is d/ . The foreign country does not do research and its population remains O.   
4.4.1. Equilibrium with Decentralized R&D Decisions 




)EßddÚ, F  3E1  31 # nF1  3vd/ d/ .d/  
Now let us consider the profit that an idea can earn from the world market 
in the open economy. The total market size is d/ .d/  O.O and the consumer 
perceived technology level is Bd/  BO|d/ . Substituting d/ .d/  O.O for 
d/ .d/  and Bd/  BO|d/  for vd/ , we know that the total expected profit that  an 
idea earns is: 
)Eßd1Ú, F  3E1  31 # nF1  3 d/  O.O/.d/Bd/  BO|d/ .d/  
The expected number of ideas that a researcher finds with a unit of labor is 
@dBd, BO. The expected payoff of a unit of labor allocated to R&D in sector 
 is @dBd, BO)Eßd1Ú, F. In equilibrium people must be indifferent 
between doing research and engaging in production: 
.d/  @dBd, BO)Eßd1Ú, F 
This implies that the new “consumer perceived technology level” is 
vd/  @dBd, BO 3E1  31 # nF1  3 Ed/  O.O/.d/ F 
Then we have: vd/vd/  @dBd, BO@dBd, BO  
The post-innovation consumer-perceived technology level in each sector is 
proportional to the expenditure share and the R&D efficiency of the sector. 
The above analysis also yields:  
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Bd/  @dBd, BO 3E1  31 # nF1  3 Ed/  O/{dF # BO|d/  
Substituting this in the trade balance condition yields: 
|d/  aE@dBd, BOBd/  @dBd, BOBd/ FOE@dBd, BOBO  @dBd, BOBOFd/ b
/CD
 
Therefore the equilibrium is defined by the above three conditions (two 
equations for R&D input and one condition for trade balance). 
4.4.2. The Hicks Path in the Open Economy 
Suppose the country size increase from d to d/ . Then R&D input is: 
4d  3E1  31 # nF1  3 Ed/  O/{d/ F # BO|d/  Bd@dBd, BO 
Suppose 
@dEBd, BOF  BO@̂dEBd/BO, 1F  BOídBd/BO 
If ídBd/BO is the constant, it implies that the research efficiency solely 
depends on the technology frontier of the foreign country. If is proportional to 
Bd/BO, the research efficiency depends only on the technology frontier of the 
home country. If it takes other forms, the research efficiency function will be 
more complicated.    
Let ~d  Bd/BO denote the home country’s advantage in sector . Then 
we have: 
4d  3E1  31 # nF1  3 Ed/  O/{d/ F # |d/  ~díd~d 
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The relationship between the R&D input and the advantage of a sector is 
determined by the functional form of  íd~d. When íd~d is constant, 
R&D input decreases with advantage. This is because the R&D efficiency 
remains constant while the returns to new ideas are lower when the home 
country technology frontier is higher. When íd~d is proportional, R&D 
input increases with advantage. This is because the research efficiency of the 
home country increases with its advantage. When íd~d takes other forms, 
there might not be a monotonic relation between R&D input and advantage. 
The following section will study how R&D input varies with advantage in the 
real world. 
4.5. Empirical Analysis 
4.5.1.  The Econometric Model 
The previous section solved the labor input for R&D in sector . If we 
convert it into monetary value it is: 
d  3E1  31 # nF1  3 Ed/  O/{d/ F.d/ # |d/  ~díd~d .d/  
where d denotes the R&D input in sector  for country ¡. For each country, 
we aggregate all other countries and take them as the foreign country.  
According to the theoretical model, the R&D input in each sector of a 
country should be positively correlated with its advantage in this sector 
( ud), which is defined as the technology frontier of the sector in the home 
country divided by that of the rest of the world. In the expression for d, 
Ed/  O/{d/ F.d/  is the world total expenditure spent on the sector after the 
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innovation.  In this paper, I assume that the expenditure is equal to the output. 
The output of a sector can be broken down into the output of the home country 
and that of the foreign country. According to the theoretical model, they are 
equally effective on R&D. In the real world, however, the magnitude of their 
effects may differ due to the presence of trade barriers. Therefore we will 
include the output of the sector  in year < (td) and that of the rest of the 
world (­td). The econometric model takes the following form: 
d  "m  "ud  "td  "æ­td  o)d  o) o)  d 
where ¡ is the country identifier,  is the industry identifier and < denotes the 
time period.  o)d, o) and o) are the country, industry and time period fixed 
effects. d is the disturbance. 
I will also study the effect of advantage on the research intensity ( d) 
for each industry. The research intensity is defined as td/td. The 
econometric model takes the following form: 
td  "m  "ud  o)d  o)  o)  d 
4.5.2.  Data and Measurements 
I use a set of STAN (STructural ANalysis) databases published by OECD 
for this inquiry. These datasets fit our purpose for several reasons. First of all, 
it is one of the few databases that provide the needed information on the 
industry level with a relatively large number of observations. The STAN 
databases have been used by some recent papers to conduct other industry 
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level analysis (e.g., Griffith et al., 2001; Zachariadis, 2004; Constinot and 
Komunjer, 2007; Ulku, 2007). Second, the countries included in the sample 
account for a large share of the world economic activities. Overall, these 
countries account for 68.7% of the world GDP (IMF 2007). When it comes to 
manufacturing, the sectors that I focus on in this work, these countries have an 
even higher share. Moreover, these countries account for most of the world 
R&D investments. Third, the trade between these countries is relatively fre, 
which is an assumption of our theoretical model. For example, the Simple 
average final bound tariff of the United States is 3.5% in 2006, while that of 
China is 10% and Brazil 31.4% in the same year (WTO 200617). Thus the 
OECD countries form a good sample for the estimation. 
This essay uses the latest version of two STAN datasets, which are STAN 
ANBERD (Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development, ed. 
2009) and STAN Industry Analysis (ed. 2008).  ANBERD database (ed. 2009) 
reports data on R&D expenditure spent by the business enterprise sector by 
industry according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
revision 3.1. The dataset covers 29 OECD countries and some non-member 
economies for years 1987 through 2007. STAN Industry Analysis (ed. 2008) 
reports annual measures of output, value added, labor input, exports, etc. by 
industry according to 3.0 across countries. Data are available for 27 countries 
for years 1970 through 2007.  
                                                          
17 WTO, 2006, World Tariff Profiles 2006. http://www.wto.org 
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Years 1987-2006 are defined as the sample period since data for 2007 are 
not available for many countries. In this paper we focus on the manufacturing 
sector since there is a large quantity of missing data for other sectors. The 
analysis is conducted mainly at the two-digit level (ISIC 15 - ISIC 37). Due to 
confidentiality or other reasons, some countries only report aggregated 
measures for industry groups for some industries. For example, some countries 
may report the measures for “Food products, beverages and tobacco” (ISIC 
code 15-16). However, they do not report neither the measures for “Food 
products, beverages” (ISIC code 15), nor the measures of “Tobacco” (ISIC 
code 16). To fully utilize the information contained in the datasets, I include 
those industry groups when no information of any sub-industry is available18.  
The productivity of sector  in country ¡ in year < (¥t d) is 
defined as the output (d) divided by the “Total Employment Persons” 
()std). According to the EK model, if the technology frontier of an 
industry is Bd, the productivity associated with each variety (Ú) is a random 
draw from the Fréchet distribution odÚ  p!q6rÜÝ&/. The expected 
productivity is BdD Γ1 # 3 where Γ1 # 3 is the Gamma function evaluated 
at 1 # 3. Therefore the technology frontier of the sector is: 
Bd  a )ÚΓ1 # 3b/D 
                                                          
18 The industry groups include (by ISIC code): 15-16, 17-19, 21-22, 23-25. 
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The average productivity of each industry is an estimate of the expected 
productivity, so the technology frontier of sector  for country ¡ 
(¥}¦4d) can be measured as: 
¥}¦4d  Bîd  G¥t dΓ1 # 3 H/D 
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I use values of θ in the range [0.1, 
0.25] with 0.15 being the preferred value. To check the robustness, I also set  3 
to 1, which means that the technology frontier of a sector (¥}¦4d ) is 
simply measured by the average productivity of the sector (¥  d).  
According to the EK model, the technology frontiers of different countries 
are additive. That is, the combined technology frontier of a group of countries 
is the sum of their technology frontier weighted by wage and trade barriers. In 
this essay the world is divided into the home country and the rest of the world, 
so the technology frontier of the rest of the world (­}¦4d) should be 
measured as the sum of the weighted technology frontier for all other 
countries.  However, I only have the information for the OECD countries and it 
is not easy to get complete information on wages and pair-wise trade barriers.  
As an alternative, the technology frontier is measured as the sum of the (un-
weighted) technology frontier of all other OECD countries. This does not 
follow the theoretical setup closely, but it is still a good measure. First, the 
OECD countries include majority of the most productive countries. The 
technology frontier calculated from them should be a good measure of the 
world technology frontier. Second, OECD countries bear substantial 
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resemblance and their mutual tariffs are low and close, so the variation of the 
weight on their technology frontier should not be large.  
All the monetary values are in 2006 PPP million dollars. All the head 
counts are in persons. The PPP exchange rate is from STAN. The discount rate 
is from the BLS.  
4.5.3. Empirical Results 
This section reports the empirical results. Preliminary regressions show 
that the R&D input decreases with the advantage for technology leaders of an 
industry (top 20%-30%), increases for the middle class countries (middle 40%-
60%) and decreases for the bottom class (bottom 20%-30%). Then I check the 
robustness of the results.  
4.5.3.1. Preliminary Results 
This section reports the OLS results. The countries are first divided into 
three groups based on their rank on the technology frontier for each industry. 
The three groups are: the top 20%, the middle 60% and bottom 20%. To 
calculate the world production, we need the output of each country. Since there 
is a large quantity of missing data on production for years before 1995 and 
after 2005, I narrow the sample period to 1995 to 2005. The results are 
reported in the first three columns of Table 4-1, with all results concerning 
dummies suppressed.  The results show that the R&D input decreases for the 
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 -0.469 2.245 
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N 1135 2891 804 1135 2891 804 


























N 1135 2891 804 
R2 0.560 0.453 0.697 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
A potential problem for the regression is that the relation between R&D 
and advantage is not linear as we can see from the analytical form of RD. If we 
look at the magnitudes of ADV, it ranges 1.4  10!ï to 16706. This is 
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because the productivity is raised to nearly the 6th  power to calculate the 
technology frontier. The ADV for technology followers clusters between 0 and 
1 while that of leaders spread over a wide range above 1. This means that the 
above results for ADV may be caused by misspecification. The following 
graph is the histogram of ADV.  
 
Figure 4-1: The Distribution of ADV 
To address this problem, I defined the following measures for advantage: 
u=d  udD 4Çd  ?ud 
u= ranges between 0.004 and 4.3;  4Ç ranges between -36.5 and 9.7.  
The following histograms show that the measures are more evenly spread over 






















Figure 4-2: The Distribution of ADVn 
 
Figure 4-3: The Distribution of adv 
I run the regressions with the new measures of advantage and the results 
are reported in the last six columns of Table 4-1. The regressions confirm the 
above results that the R&D input decreases for the top and bottom groups, but 
increases for the middle groups. 
I use value added as the output of each industry and run all the above 
regressions again. The results are reported in Table 4-2. We can see that the 
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N 1136 3197 887 1136 3197 887 





























N 1136 3197 887 
R2 0.511 0.421 0.695 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
I also check if the results are robust to the value of 3. Previous literature ( 
Eaton and Kortum 2002, Alvarez and Lucas 2007) shows that a reasonable 
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range for 3 is [0.1, 0.25]. I find that the results are consistent to those when 3 
is 0.15. Finally, I set 3 to 1, which means that the average productivity is used 
as the technology frontier of an industry.  
 
Table 4-3: R&D Input and Advantage (OLS, θ=1) 













ADV                 -6000 10000 -6900 -8000 11000 -17000 










PROD                0.022 0.020 0.023 0.091 0.047 0.076 












ROWPROD             -0.0002 -0.001 0.002 -5.6E-04 -0.00358 -4.8E-
05 









N                   1135 2891 804 1136 3197 887 
R2   0.562 0.455 0.695 0.516 0.423 0.692 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
The above results may be sensitive to how we categorize countries leaders 
and followers. As an alternative, I divide them into the top 30%, the middle 
40% and bottom 30%.  The results are reported in table 4-4 for 3  0.15 and 
3  1. They confirm the patterns that I get from other regressions.  
I also try other ways to partition the countries. It turns out that the pattern 





Table 4-4: R&D Input and Advantage (OLS, Alternative Categorization) 
Panel a: 3  0.15 













ADV                 -49000 27000 -0.11 -86000 1000 -0.28 
                    -1.750 
* 




PROD                0.025 0.019 0.022 0.112 0.047 0.069 












ROWPROD             -2.5E-04 -0.001 0.001 -8.2E-04 -0.005 0.000 









N                   1538 2093 1199 1562 2358 1300 
R2   0.783 0.437 0.642 0.791 0.418 0.640 
Panel b: 3  1 













ADV                 -320 13000 -8900 -4000 12000 -16000 










PROD                0.025 0.019 0.022 0.112 0.047 0.070 












ROWPROD             -2.5E-04 -0.001 0.001 -7.6E-04 -0.005 0.000 









N                   1538 2093 1199 1562 2358 1300 
R2   0.783 0.438 0.644 0.791 0.420 0.647 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 




Since the data consists of different countries and industries, heterogeneity 
is a concern. This section checks if the results of the previous section are 
robust to heterogeneity. The results are consistent with those of the OLS 
regressions except a few changes. 














ADV dropped 1400 -0.23    




   
ADVn    -54 120 -700 



















ROWPROD 0.0E+00 -8.2E-05 -6.1E-04 4.0E-06 -1.0E-04 -7.8E-04 






































N 1135 2891 804 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
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• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
The following table presents the results when value added (VALU) is used 
as the output. 

















































































N 1136 3197 887 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
120 
 
The following table reports the results when 3  1. 
Table 4-7: R&D Input and Advantage (Heteroskedasticity corrected, PROD as 
Output, θ=1) 













ADV                 -930 3900 -3200 -1000 2500 -5000 












PROD                0.0074 0.0152 0.0206    






   
ROWPROD             2.0E-06 -5.7E-05 -7.9E-04    






   
VALU    0.0328 0.0438 0.0608 






ROWVALU    1.4E-05 -6.7E-05 -1.3E-03 






N                   1135 2891 804 1136 3197 887 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
I also try other values for 3. The results tend to robust to the choice of 3. 
4.5.3.3. Endogeneity 
There might be concerns over the endogeneity of advantage, although our 
theoretical model indicates that it is exogenous at period <. In the real world 
research projects last a long time and endogeneity may arise due to 
autocorrelation. This section will address this problem with instrumental-
variable regressions.  
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I use a country’s percentage share in the world production (PRODShare) as 
the instrument for the home country’s advantage in a sector (u) for the 
same time period. Other candidates for instrument are the export-import ratio 
(XM) and the lag of advantage (ud!). However, none of them, or any 
combination of them with tð¡@p can pass the Hausman test for any 
regression. The results are reported in the following table. 
Table 4-8: R&D Input and Advantage (IV) 













ADV                 -4.3E+13 30000 -2 8.4E+12 78000 -2 







PROD                0.064 0.003 0.021    
                     1.358 1.117 4.734 
*** 
   
ROWPROD             1.3E-04 -3.6E-04 -0.002    
                     0.748 -3.764 
*** 
-1.164    
VALU    -0.004 -0.044 0.055 
                        -0.045 -1.39 2.797 
*** 
ROWVALU    -9.5E-05 -0.002 -0.009 
                        0.52 -3.049 
*** 
-1.556 




0.335 0.026 0.026 0.494 0.054 0.129 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
The first three columns are the results when PROD is used as output. It 
confirms the pattern yielded by OLS. I use VALU as output and rerun the 
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regressions and the results are reported in the last three columns. Though the 
sign of ADV is different from what we got, those of the top group and negative 
for the middle group remain consistent with previous results. To check if the 
results are robust to the value of 3, I run the regressions give different values 
between 0.1 and 0.25. We can see that the results are very similar to those in 
Table 4-8. 
I then use the average productivity as the technology frontier to estimate 
the effects of ADV. The results are as follows. The results give even stronger 
support to the OLS results. I find that when 3 increases the correlation between 
u and tð¡@p increases. Therefore, the difference between the results 
in tables 4-7 and 4-8 may be because tð¡@p becomes a better 
instrument when 3 increases. This is consistent with the results of Hausman 
tests. 
Table 4-9: R&D Input and Advantage (IV, θ=1) 













ADV                 -26000 40000 -45000 -23000 110000 -46000 










PROD                0.025 0.006 0.023    






   
ROWPROD             -1.5E-04 -3.2E-04 -2.5E-04    




-0.275    
VALU    0.102 -0.025 0.053 




ROWVALU    -3.9E-04 -1.0E-03 -7.3E-
03 










0.0063 0.0004 0.0158 0.321 0.003 0.0805 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
I use different approaches to categorize country to see if the above results 
are robust. The following is the results when countries are broke down into the 
top 30%, the middle 40% and bottom 30%.   
Table 4-10: R&D Input and Advantage (IV, Alternative Categorization) 













ADV                 -410000 53000 -2.1 24000 130000 -2 




0.176 1.042 -1.833 
* 
PROD                0.0131 0.0001 0.0167    




   
ROWPROD             -1.1E-04 -4.4E-
04 
-1.4E-03    




-1.381    
VALU    0.0381 -0.0602 0.043 




ROWVALU    -0.0002 -0.002 -0.0062 










0.002 0.1164 0.0049 0.8603 0.2972 0.0704 
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
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• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
4.5.3.4. Research Intensity 
This section studies the effect of advantage on the research intensity to see 
if we can get further support for the results we get from OLS estimation. Since
the econometric model for research intensity does not include world output, we 
do not need to worry about the missing data problem. The regressions in this 
section are based on the sample period 1987-2006. I use the method employed 
in the first regression to categorize countries (top 20%, middle 60%, bottom 
20% ).  The results are reported in Table 4-11. 













ADV                 -160.000 0.028 0.000    
                    -2.283 
** 
0.502 0.483    
ADVn    -0.231 0.005 -0.001 
    -4.565 
*** 
0.647 -0.605 
adv       
       
N                   1135 2891 804 1135 2891 804 












N                   1135 2891 804 





• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
The above results show that the research intensity for the middle groups 
increases with advantage and decreases for the other two groups, even though 
the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. 
The following table reports the results when 3  1. 
Table 4-12: R&D Intensity and Advantage (OLS and IV, θ=1) 













ADV                 -3.000 0.048 -0.003 -1.3 0.0421 -0.2955 
                    -5.220 
*** 
0.565 -0.131 -0.845 0.102 -3.304 
*** 
N                   1135 2891 804 1135 2891 804 
R2    0.1788 0.4178 0.7285    
Note:  
• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
As the following table shows, the results are robust to heteroskedasticity: 







ADV                 -2.4 0.11418 -2E-06 










• The t-ratios are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
• *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level ; ***: significant 
at 1% level. 
The above results provide some further support to the pattern we find with 
OLS.  
4.6. Conclusion 
Hicks (1953) argued that countries would first improve their technology of 
the export sector and then that of the import sector. Interesting as it is, there 
has not been theoretical or empirical study on his argument. This essay extends 
the Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework into a multi-sector model to analyze 
the innovation pattern of countries in the open economy. The model shows that 
in the open economy the R&D input in an industry depends on the country’s 
advantage in the industry.  Using the OECD STAN database, the empirical 
analysis finds some support for Hicks’ path but it also indicates that the R&D 
pattern in the real world might be richer than what Hicks predicted.  
4.7. Appendices 
4.7.1. Appendix 4.A: The Equilibrium without Technological 
Improvements 
This section solves the equilibrium of the world economy when all firms in 
a country have access to the best technology within the country. Suppose the 
technology frontier of sector  in the home country is Bd and that in the 
foreign country is BO. Following Alvarez and Lucas’ (2007), the Fréchet 
distribution of z into the exponential distribution of x with Ú  !D: 
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od  1 # p!q6r:, )  1/Bd 
• Price Indices of the Final Goods 
Consider sector i, let   Ed, OF denote the draws productivity for 
intermediate goods in two countries. Assume that these draws are independent 
across countries, so the joint density of x is: 
À  ÀdÀO  BdBO expE#Bdd # BOOF 
Let  follow the above distribution, then the quantity of the final good is: 
f  aj Àk!/l4Á(  b
l/l!
 
I put all the intermediate goods with productivity  into to the same group. 
Following Alvarez and Lucas, the group of goods is labeled with the associated 
productivity and are called “good ”. 
Let us use the home country as an example. In the home country, the price 
of final goods in each sector is: 
td  aj d!lÁ( À4b
/!l
 
The demand function of intermediate good x in the home country is: 
kd  d!ltlfd 
If the home country producers of the final goods buy intermediate goods 
from domestic firms, the price is .ddD  ; if they buy from foreign firms, the 
price is <.OOD  . The buyers will choose the lowest price among .ddD   and 
.OOD  . The price that prevail in the home country is: 
d  minÂ.ddD  , .OOD  Ã  
128 
 
d/D  minÄ.d/Dd, .O/DOÅ 
where d~ expBd , O~ expEBOF,. A nice property of the 
exponential distribution is that(Alvarez and Lucas, 2007):  
~ expB =4 Æ  0  Æ~exp B/Æ 
Consequently we have: 
.d/Dd~ expXBd/.d/DY 
Another property of the exponential distribution is that(Alvarez and Lucas, 
2007): 
~ expB , ~ expB , W?Ç,   0, È  min,   È~B  B 
Therefore d/D has the following distribution: 
d/D~ exp GXBd  BO.d/D/.O/D Y/.d/DH 
Let vd  Bd  BO.d/D/.O/D , then we have: 
Ê/D~ expXvÊ/.Ê/DY 
 We can call vd the “consumer-perceived” sector  technology level in  
the home country. For ease in writing, I define {d  .d/.O ,  |d 
.d/D/.O/D. Through out this paper, the wage rate in the foreign country is 
defined as the numéraire. Then we have: 
vd  Bd  BO|d 
Consider  w d!lÁ( À4. Since À is the probability distribution 
function of x, so the integral can be taken as the expectation of  d!l in the 
technology spaceC . d!l  with ~À in C  corresponds to d!l 
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d/DD!l  ÇD!l with Ç~ expXvd/.d/DY in C . Here Ç is the projection 
of d/D on C . Therefore, the expectation of  d!l in the technology space 
is equivalent to the expectation of  ÇD!l in C . This implies that 
td  aj ÇD!lvd/.d/Dp!Ë¼6r/1r&/4Çzm b
/!l
 
Let x  Çvd/.d/D, we have that: 
td  Xvd/.d/DY!D  aj xD!lp!y4xzm b
/!l
 
Let u  Ew xD!lp!y4xzm F/!l, which is value of the Gamma function ΓÍ at Í  1  31 # n raised to 1/1 # n power. Following Alvarez and 
Lucas (2007), we assume 1  31 # n  0 so as to guarantee the integral 
converges. Henceforth, we will take A as a constant. So we have: 
td  uvd!D.d 
Likewise, the price of good  in the foreign country is: 
tO  uvO!D.O 
 
• Imports and Exports 
The value of the final goods  consumed in the home country is equal to 
tdfd. Since the market of the final goods is perfectly competitive, dfd 
equals the value of the intermediate goods (transportation costs inclusive) used 
as input. Let }d denote the share of the sector  intermediate goods that the 
home country imports from the foreign country. Then the imports of the home 
country in sector  are: 
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sd  }dtdfd 
In a previous paper, we show that 
}d  BO|dvd  
where BO|d/ is the foreign country’s technology level perceived by the 
home country consumers. The higher is it, the greater  }d is. 
Given the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we have: 
sd  BO|dDCd.OBd  BO|d  
Therefore, the import of the home country is: 
sd  a BOBd  BO|d  BOBd  BO|db |dDCd.O 
Since 3  0, sdis increasing in |d(a monotonic transformation of the 
relative wage rate), keeping everything else constant.  
The sector  export of the home country (d) equal the sector  exports of 
foreign country( sO), so the total exports of the home country are: 
d  a BdBO|d  Bd  BdBO|d  Bdb O.O 
The above equation shows that the exports of the home country decrease 
with the relative wage rate. 
• Equilibrium 
For notational clarity, let ~d  Bd/BO , ~d  Bd/BO denote the 
absolute advantage of the home country in two sectors. Plugging them into the 
trade balance condition d  sd yields: 
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O G ~d|d  ~d  ~d|d  ~dH  G ~d  |d  ~d  |dH d|dDC 
 
4.7.2. Appendix 4.B: The Expected Value of an Idea in Autarky 
Suppose the current technological frontier of sector  in the home country 
is Bd. The population is d/ . The expectation of ßddÚ,  is: 
)EßddÚ, F  j j ßddÚ, ÚÀ4Ú4Üg¯dÁ(   ul!vd/ D!ld/ .d/ l j j d/ z1r0 /26r0
z
m# .d/ /ÚÚ4Úd/ !l>2dd4d 
where W¡ denotes the set of z in which the new idea is competitive . For 
ease in writing, we use p to denote d/  in the integrand. Then we have: 
)EßddÚ, F  ul!vd/ D!ld/ .d/ l j j z1r0 /2
z
m# .d/ /ÚÚ4Ú!l>2d4 
Since Ú  1 # Ú!/D  Ú  Ú!/D!/3, The inner integral is: 
 
j  # .d/ /ÚÚ4Úz1r0 /2  j  # .d/ /ÚÚ!/D!/34Ú
z
1r0 /2   .d/ /!/D 31  3  
Then we have: 
j j  # .d/ /ÚÚ4Ú!l>24z1r0 /26r0
z
m  3.d/
!/D1  3 j C/D!l>2d4zm  
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 Consider the integral w C/D!l>2d4zm . We know that d/ /D~ exp Xvd/ /.d/ /DY , therefore let us denote the integral in terms of Ç  /D, Ç~ exp Xvd/ /.d/ /DY: 
j C/D!l>2d4zm  Xvd/ /.d/ /DY j ÇC/D!lDp!G¼6r0 /1r0 &/HË4Çzm  
Let x  Xvd/ /.d/ /DY Ç  Ç  x/ Xvd/ /.d/ /DY: 
j C/D!l>2d4zm  Xvd/ /.d/ /DY!C/D!lD j xC/D!lDp!y4xzm  
The last term w xC/D!lDp!y4xzm  is value of the Gamma function ΓÍ 
at Í  1  1  1/3 # n3  2  1 # n3. Let us denote it with  Γ2 1 # n3. Since we assumed 1  31 # n  0 , Γ2  1 # n3 is defined. 
Then we have: 
j j  # .d/ /ÚÚ4Ú!l>24z1r0 /26r0
z
m  31  3 Γ2  1 # n3vd/ !C/D!lD.d/ !l 
Therefore we have: 
)EßddÚ, F  ul!d/ 31  3 Γ2  1 # n3vd/ !.d/  
We defined that u  Ew xD!lp!y4xzm F/!l, which is value of the Gamma 
function ΓÍ at Í  1  31 # n raised to 1/1 # n power. Therefore: 
ul!  XΓE1  31 # nF/!lYl!  ΓE1  31 # nF! 
Substituting it into )EßddÚ, F yields: 











5.1. Summary of the Study 
This study investigates the optimal strategy and the welfare effects of 
technology improvements in the open economy. It also studies the effects of 
the changes in the degree of heterogeneity and tests a prediction concerning 
comparative advantage.  
The first essay studies these questions with the Ricardian model. The paper 
formally proves Hicks’ (1953) insight into the effects of technological 
improvement. The paper then studies optimal strategies of technological 
improvement and show that for a small country it is optimal to choose export-
biased technological improvement. For a large country, it is optimal to improve 
technology in both sectors at a rate proportional to the consumers’ expenditure 
share.  
The second essay studies the effects of technological changes with a two-
sector Eaton and Kortum model. This paper distinguishes two types of 
technological changes: changes in the technology levels (technology 
improvements) and changes in the dispersion of productivity of firms. The 
paper analyzes how the two types of technological changes affect the trade 
pattern. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of technology 
improvements and yields some new results. The theoretical model of the paper 
shows that the net exports of the comparative advantage sector are positive 
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while those of the other sector are negative. Using the OECD STAN database, 
the paper tests the prediction and finds strong support for it. 
The third essay extends the Eaton and Kortum framework into a multi-
sector model to analyze the innovation pattern of countries.  The model 
analyzes the R&D pattern of a country in autarky. The paper also shows that in 
the open economy the R&D input in an industry depends on the country’s 
advantage in the industry.   Using the OECD STAN database, the empirical 
analysis finds some support for Hicks’ path, a technology improvement 
strategy for countries advanced by Hicks, but it also indicates that the R&D 
pattern in the real world might be richer than what Hicks predicted. 
5.2. Limitations of the Study 
The first essay is based on the Ricardian model. As important as the model 
is, “the problem with the (Ricardian) model as a vehicle for discussing 
technical change is that too many things can happen (Krugman, 1986).”  The 
discreteness of trade regime switches degenerates the study into a case-by-case 
study and keeps us from coming to unified conclusions. Moreover, the 
Ricardian model makes some strong assumptions, such as perfect competition 
and homogeneous firms. 
The second essay solves the problem of trade regime switches that is 
inherent to the Ricardian model by introducing heterogeneity. However, the 
model still has some strong assumptions. First, the model assumes a uniform 
degree of heterogeneity for both industries in all countries. This assumption 
keeps the model tractable, but it loses some generality since in reality the 
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degree of heterogeneity varies across industries and countries. Second, the 
Fréchet distribution does not provide a perfect convergence to the traditional 
Ricardian model when the degree of heterogeneity approaches zero. Third, the 
sample size of the empirical analysis is relatively small. 
The third essay is based on a static model and dispenses with strategic 
interactions between countries. In reality, it takes time for R&D input turn into 
new ideas and the R&D input of a project is spread over multiple periods. 
Therefore, the R&D problem is essentially a dynamic one. The strategic 
interactions between countries also play an important role in the real world. 
Due to data availability, it is unclear whether the empirical results apply to 
non-OECD countries.  
Besides the limitations that are specific to individual papers, there are some 
qualifications that are common to the entire study. First of all, this study does 
not consider the composition of endowments. Through the inquiry, this work 
assumes that there is only one endowment while in the real world the 
composition of endowments varies substantially across countries. The 
composition of endowments may exert extensive influence on the R&D pattern 
of a country. Second, the study does not consider technology diffusion, 
intellectual rights protection. Third, this study does not consider the trend that 
multi-national companies are doing more and more research overseas.   
5.3. Possible Extensions 
The second and third essays assume that the degree of heterogeneity 
remains the same across industries and countries. Perhaps the assumption can 
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be relaxed in future inquiry to study what will happen when the degree of 
heterogeneity of different industries changes at different paces. 
The theoretical model of the third essay can be extended to dynamic 
versions to study the R&D patterns of countries. This might yield more 
insights into the R&D strategy.  
Perhaps the models of the second and third essays can be extended to 
incorporate multiple endowments.  The models can also be extended to study 
technology diffusion and intellectual rights protection. 
5.4. Conclusion 
This study investigates the effects and the strategy of technology 
improvements in the open economy. It unifies the results existing in the 
literature, which are mainly based on the Ricardian model. Then the study 
extends the Eaton-and-Kortum model into multi-sector models to study the 
above issues. The new models encompass the existing results based on 
Ricardian model as special cases and yield new some theoretical results. Some 
of these results are tested empirically and are found to be consistent with the 
data. The theoretical and empirical results of this study contribute to 
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